



Whitehead's God and Wŏnhyo's One Mind: A Buddhist Resolution to the Problem of the Two Natures

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Abstract: *This article argues that Whitehead's antitheses at Process and Reality 348 instantiate the formal relation that the seventh-century Korean Buddhist commentator Wŏnhyo (617–686) specifies as non-identity-non-difference (Korean: pi-il pi-i) in his readings of the Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith. The unity-problem internal to process theology—how the primordial and consequent natures of God can be predicated of one actual entity without collapsing into either identity or mere conjunction—has been evaded in four ways within Whitehead scholarship: Ford historicizes it, Hartsborne dissolves it through the society-of-occasions revision, Griffin softens it into asymmetric complexity, and Sherburne refuses it by eliminating God from the system. None of these supplies the formal analysis Whitehead's text presupposes. Wŏnhyo's apparatus, by contrast, explicitly specifies a relation that is neither identity nor difference, grounded in the metaphysics of qualified momentariness: the conditioned pole of reality is radically momentary while the unconditioned pole is not. The article argues that this formal homology survives the most serious objections one can raise against it, and that the same metaphysical commitment—qualified momentariness—underwrites the dipolar structure on both sides. The result is a defense of strict Whiteheadian dipolarity that requires no revision of Whitehead's text and that demonstrates the analytical contribution comparative philosophy of religion can make to ongoing problems within single traditions.*

1. Introduction: The Problem of Divine Immutability

The dominant tradition of philosophical theology in the West has insisted that God is immutable—unchanging, impassible, and eternal in the sense of being wholly outside the flux of time. From Augustine's *nunc stans* to Aquinas's *actus purus* to the divine simplicity doctrine of classical theism, the assumption has been that the greater God's perfection, the more radically God transcends the changeability that characterizes creaturely existence. On this view, the relationship between the divine and the temporally conditioned world is necessarily asymmetrical: the world changes, suffers, and passes away; God endures, impassible and complete, in a mode of existence that has no genuine analogue within human experience (Thomas Aquinas I.9.1-2, I.10.1-4; Davies 67-85; Helm).

This identification of divine perfection with immutability has not gone unchallenged. The process theology tradition inaugurated by Alfred North Whitehead and Charles Hartshorne argues that a God who is genuinely related to the world—who genuinely knows and responds to creaturely suffering—must be a God who changes. On this view, the classical tradition has purchased divine perfection at too high a price: a God who is genuinely immutable and impassible is also genuinely unresponsive, untouched by the cries of the afflicted, and therefore not a fitting object of prayer, worship, or genuine address. The tension between divine perfection-as-immutability and divine perfection-as-responsiveness is one of the deepest problems of philosophical theology.

Whitehead's response to this tension in *Process and Reality* is well known: God is conceived as a dipolar reality, with a primordial nature (eternal, unchanging, the envisagement of all eternal objects) and a consequent nature (temporal, changing, the receptive prehension of the actualities of the world) (PR 342-351). The dipolar conception culminates in the celebrated antitheses of PR 348:

It is as true to say that God is permanent and the World fluent, as that the World is permanent and God is fluent. It is as true to say that God is one and the World many, as that the World is one and God many....It is as true to say that God creates the World, as that the World creates God.

These antitheses present, in Whitehead's own words, “a shift of meaning which converts the opposition into a contrast” (PR 348). The reader is told *that* the

opposition becomes a contrast but is not told *how*. The dipolar God is asserted; the formal structure that makes the dipolarity coherent is left unanalyzed. This is the gap that the present article aims to close.

1.2 The Internal Difficulty

The unity of Whitehead's dipolar God has been a persistent source of difficulty within process theology itself. The most painstaking textual analysis of this difficulty is that of Lewis Ford, whose multi-decade reconstruction of the compositional history of *Process and Reality* concluded that the consequent nature of God was a relatively late addition to the text—an insertion made during the final preparation of the Gifford Lectures for publication in 1929, after the bulk of the metaphysical apparatus of the book had already been set down (Ford *Emergence*, ch. 5-6; also “Some Proposals”; *Transforming*). On Ford's account, Whitehead's two natures were never fully integrated into a single seamless conception; the antitheses of PR 348 represent an attempt to articulate a unity-in-tension that Whitehead himself did not have time to systematize.

Hartshorne, working from a different angle, argued that Whitehead's conception of God as a single actual entity was simply incoherent, and that the dipolar conception could be saved only by recasting God as a personally ordered society of actual entities, each instantiating the divine character (Hartshorne “Whitehead's”; also *CSPM*, ch. 1-2). Griffin has more recently defended the strict-Whiteheadian view against the Hartshornean revision, but he has done so by characterizing Whitehead's single-actual-entity conception as one of Whitehead's most serious philosophical errors and proposing his own dipolar revision (Griffin, ch. 4; also see Shields and Viney 3.1).

The most radical response to the unity-problem comes from Donald Sherburne, whose 1967 *Christian Scholar* article “Whitehead Without God” argued that the difficulties surrounding the consequent nature of God were sufficiently severe that the most honest response was to eliminate God from Whitehead's system altogether (Sherburne “Whitehead”; also “Decentering”). For Sherburne, the functions Whitehead attributes to God—preserving the past, grounding eternal objects, providing initial subjective aims—can either be performed by creativity itself or are dispensable; the price of the dipolar conception is too high, and the system functions more coherently without it. The persistence of the Sherburnean option within process scholarship—

Sherburne himself returning to it as recently as 1986—is itself testimony to the depth of the unity-problem.

1.3 The Buddhist Resource

The argument of this article is that the formal analysis Whitehead's antitheses require—an analysis Whitehead himself did not supply, and that subsequent process scholars have variously evaded, dissolved, or refused—is available within a tradition Whitehead did not know. The *Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith* (*Dasbeng qixin lun*), the central treatise of East Asian *Tathāgatagarbha* Buddhism, contains a remarkable analytical formula for relating two structurally opposed aspects of one ultimate reality:

As for what arises and ceases [in the mind]: depending on the *tathāgatagarbha*, there is a mind of arising-and-ceasing. The unborn-and-unceasing and what arises-and-ceases are harmonized (*hwahap*), not-one and non-different (*pi-il pi-i*); this is named the *alayavijñāna*. (Paramārtha 576b)¹

The relation that the *Awakening of Faith* specifies between the unborn-and-unceasing pole (unconditioned, eternal) and the arising-and-ceasing pole (conditioned, momentary) of the *ālayavijñāna* is exactly what Whitehead's antitheses need: a relation that is neither numerical identity (which would collapse the two poles into one) nor outright difference (which would split the unity), but rather a structured unity-in-dipolarity. Wŏnhyo's commentarial elaboration of this formula in his *Taesŭng kisillon so* and his *Kŭmgang sammaegyŏng non* develops non-identity-non-difference into a general logical structure capable of bearing systematic philosophical weight (Wŏnhyo, *Taesung kisillon so*, especially regarding *zongche*; also Un Chonghui, ch. 2).

1.4 The Thesis and the Plan of the Article

The thesis of the article, stated in its strongest form, is the following: Whitehead's dipolar God admits of a unity that satisfies *Process and Reality*'s own metaphysical commitments only when its two natures are read as standing in

¹ The orthography *ariyasik* (rather than the later Xuanzang-translation form *aroyasik*) is the Paramārtha-translation form, used throughout the *Awakening of Faith* and preserved in Wŏnhyo's commentaries. The two transcriptions render the same Sanskrit term, *alayavijñāna*, but mark distinct translation lineages.

the relation of *non-identity-non-difference*—a relation Whitehead does not explicitly formulate but which his text repeatedly approaches, and which Wŏnhyo's commentarial tradition makes formally explicit. The metaphysical ground of this relation, in both Whitehead's and Wŏnhyo's frameworks, is a *qualified* doctrine of momentariness: the thesis that the conditioned domain (the *consequent* in Whitehead, the *saengmyŏl* in Wŏnhyo) is radically momentary, while the unconditioned ground (the *primordial* in Whitehead, the *pulsaeng pulmyŏl* in Wŏnhyo) is not.

The argument develops as follows. Section 2 reconstructs the unity-problem within process theological scholarship, tracking how Ford, Hartshorne, Griffin, and Sherburne have engaged it. Section 3 reconstructs Wŏnhyo's logic of *non-identity-non-difference* through his *Awakening of Faith* commentaries and the *Vajrasamādhi Commentary*. Section 4, the formal center of the paper, argues for the structural homology between Whitehead's antitheses (PR 348) and Wŏnhyo's *non-identity-non-difference*. Section 5 grounds the homology in a shared metaphysical commitment—qualified momentariness—that distinguishes both thinkers from full-blown momentarist alternatives. Section 6 concludes by drawing out the implications for process theology and for the methodology of comparative philosophy of religion.

This paper builds on a recent body of comparative work—most notably the studies of Steve Odin, John Cobb, Christopher Ives, and, in the Korean context, Kwŏn Sŏ-yong—that has established formal parallels between process philosophy and East Asian Buddhist thought (see Odin; Cobb and Ives; Kwon Soyong, “Wonhyo”). What this paper adds is the move from *parallel* to *resource*: the claim that the comparative encounter is not merely an exercise in mutual illumination but a position from which Wŏnhyo can be read as offering a formal contribution to a problem internal to process theology. The direction of contribution, in other words, runs from East Asia to the West rather than (as is more typical) the reverse.²

2. The Problem of the Two Natures within Whitehead Scholarship

The problem this paper takes as its target is not a manufactured one. It is internal to process theology, and the four most consequential responses to it—

² The methodological commitment to *formal* rather than substantive comparison is developed in section 4.3 below, where the objection from foreignness is faced directly.

Ford's, Hartshorne's, Griffin's, and Sherburne's—each leave the formal core of the difficulty unresolved. Reconstructing those four responses is the work of this section. The aim is not to adjudicate among them but to display the shape of the residue they share: a problem about *how* the primordial and consequent natures of God constitute one actual entity, on Whitehead's own metaphysical terms, that no party to the dispute has formally answered.

2.1 Ford and the Compositional Argument

The most disquieting voice in the discussion belongs to Lewis Ford. Ford spent more than two decades reconstructing the compositional history of *Process and Reality*, and his conclusion is uncomfortable for the standard reading of the text: the consequent nature of God was not part of Whitehead's metaphysics until very late in the composition of the book (Ford, "Some Proposals"; *Emergence* ch. 5-6). On Ford's account, the substance of *Process and Reality*—Parts II through IV, much of I.2–3—was largely in place before Whitehead turned again to natural theology and discovered what would become the temporal aspect of God's nature. The famous antitheses of *PR* 348 and the three-fold characterization of God at *PR* 87–88, which utilize the contrast between the two natures, are on Ford's stratigraphic reading among the *latest* insertions: written, in the case of the 87–88 passage, to retrofit the system after Whitehead realized that what he had been writing about actual entities did not, in fact, apply straightforwardly to God.

Ford himself drew the obvious sobering conclusion: process theology "lives in large measure from Whitehead's discovery of the consequent nature of God," and that discovery may itself have been an accident of Whitehead's having to deliver a half-chapter on natural theology for the Gifford Lectures. This is more damaging to the dipolar conception than it might first appear. If the consequent nature was inserted late, then the categoreal apparatus of *Process and Reality*—concrescence, the threefold character, the subjective aim—was not built with dipolar divinity in view. The text as we have it is a palimpsest. And the philosophical question that survives Ford's compositional thesis is whether the result is *systematically* coherent or only stitched together. Ford is non-committal on the deepest version of this question; his work clarifies what the problem is without resolving it.

The cost of Ford's reading, then, is that it reframes the unity-question. The two natures are not given as a single integrated insight that the reader's task is to unfold; they are the outcome of a textual accretion that subsequent

interpreters must somehow make philosophically whole.³ What is required, at minimum, is a formal account of how a primordial pole written one way and a consequent pole written another can be predicated of a single actual entity. Ford does not provide such an account, and on his own showing, Whitehead himself never quite did.

2.2 Hartshorne and the Society-of-Occasions Revision

Charles Hartshorne, Whitehead's closest philosophical heir, takes the unity-problem seriously enough to revise Whitehead's view. His proposal is straightforward: drop the claim that God is a single actual entity. God is, instead, a "personally ordered society" of actual occasions, each of which inherits the abstract divine character from its predecessor (see Hartshorne, *CSPM*, ch. 1-2; *DR*). The *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* renders Hartshorne's own articulation with refreshing bluntness: "Unlike Whitehead, I...define God as an enduring society of actualities, not a single actuality. Here I think Whitehead was just mistaken" (see Viney 3.1; also Hartshorne, "Development").

This is an interpretive surgery, not a defense. Hartshorne perceives, correctly, that the same Whiteheadian categories that govern temporal occasions cannot also govern an entity that is supposed to be both primordial (eternal, complete) and consequent (temporally responsive). If God is a single actual entity in the sense that an electronic occasion is, then God must concesce—must arise, integrate, and perish. But on the Whiteheadian definition of an occasion, the moment its becoming is complete, its subjectivity perishes into objective immortality (*PR* 29, 81, 137, 213). A divine actual entity that perishes in the Whiteheadian sense is no divine actual entity at all. Hartshorne's solution is to deny that God is one occasion; God is an indefinite succession of them, the *abstract character* of divinity persisting across the succession as the defining trait of the society.

The cost of Hartshorne's move is high. He has solved one problem by reframing the question, but the reframing dissolves the original Whiteheadian texture. The *PR* 348 antitheses are not, on Hartshorne's reading, statements

³ For sympathetic but critical engagement with Ford's compositional thesis, see Lucas. For the broader debate among Whitehead interpreters between "genetic," "traditional," and "systematic" approaches to *Process and Reality*, see also the discussions in *Process Studies* through the 1980s and 1990s.

about the dipolar structure of one entity; they become statements about an abstract eternal character (the would-be primordial) and the changing concrete states of a divine society (the would-be consequent). And—this is the philosophical cost—the *unity* the antitheses gesture toward is no longer a metaphysical claim about a single being but a logical claim about a generic essence shared across instances. The original problem, the problem of how an *individual* actual entity can be both permanent and fluent, both one and many, both creator and created, is not solved on Hartshorne's revision; it is removed from the agenda.

One can be sympathetic to Hartshorne while observing that his answer is not a defense of Whitehead. It is a friendly amendment serious enough to count as a different position. The unity-problem within Whitehead's own dipolar conception remains where Ford left it.

2.3 Griffin and the Defense via Reform

David Ray Griffin sits between Ford and Hartshorne in a way that turns out to be unstable. He shares Hartshorne's worry about treating God as a single actual entity—indeed, he treats this aspect of Whitehead's doctrine as one of Whitehead's most serious philosophical errors, characterizing it in unusually strong language for the irenic tradition of process scholarship (Griffin ch. 4, especially 149-152; Viney 3.1). But he wants, unlike Sherburne, to preserve a robust process theism, and his elaboration of dipolar theism over the course of *Reenchantment without Supernaturalism* tries to read Whitehead in a manner that retains the dipolar structure while loosening the requirement of strict numerical unity (Griffin 140-177).

The maneuver is delicate. Griffin distinguishes a strict Whiteheadian dipolarity (where two abstractable poles characterize one concrete actual entity) from what he calls a more Hartshornean dipolarity (where the contrasts apply asymmetrically across an enduring divine society). He preserves Whitehead's vocabulary of primordial and consequent natures, the language of *PR* 348, the pastoral and theological weight of the consequent nature as the "fellow-sufferer who understands" (*PR* 351). But he relocates the metaphysical commitment: it is no longer that one entity bears both natures; it is that the divine reality, however its individuation is finally analyzed, includes both an eternal and a temporal aspect.

This is honest revisionism, and Griffin is more candid about its costs than Hartshorne tends to be. What it does not deliver, however, is a defense of the

strict Whiteheadian thesis. Griffin has loosened the unity claim rather than vindicated it. The formal residue of Whitehead's *PR* 348 antitheses—that they predicate apparently contradictory pairs of one and the same God—is not given a formal account within Griffin's framework; it is downgraded to a regulative description of a complex but ultimately societally structured divine reality. The problem, in other words, is not solved; it is dissolved through a substantive metaphysical revision.

2.4 Sherburne and the Eliminativist Option

The fourth response is the most radical. Donald Sherburne, in "Whitehead Without God," concedes the unity-problem in its strongest form and draws the inference that the process tradition has done most to avoid: if God's role in the system generates incoherences, then God should be eliminated from the system. Sherburne identifies three functions Whitehead's God performs—preserving the past, grounding eternal objects, and providing initial subjective aims—and argues that each role either violates the categoreal scheme (chiefly the ontological principle and the principle of contemporary independence) or can be reassigned to creativity itself without metaphysical loss (Sherburne 252–253).

The argument is sharp in places, and worth taking seriously. Sherburne shows that if God is to preserve the past by prehending occasions in their immediate becoming, then God mustprehend contemporaries, in violation of *PR* 102; and if God is to ground the past by being its causal source, then either God is an exception to the ontological principle or God prehends what is no longer actual, which is also forbidden.⁴ The principle Whitehead insisted upon—that God is "not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles, invoked to save their collapse," but rather "their chief exemplification" (*PR* 343)⁵—comes out, on Sherburne's analysis, very poorly observed in *Process and Reality* itself.

⁴ Sherburne, "Whitehead Without God," 254–258. The argument turns on *PR* 95 (causal independence of contemporaries) and *PR* 102 (definition of contemporary occasions), against the Christian–Hartshorne–Cobb attempts to have Godprehend occasions in their immediacy of becoming.

⁵ Whitehead, *PR* 343. Sherburne invokes the same passage at "Whitehead Without God," 257, against Hartshorne's interpretive accommodation; the passage reads in full: "God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles, invoked to save their collapse. He is their chief exemplification."

What Sherburne does *not* address, because his project is eliminativist, is the unity-problem in its narrower formal version. He argues that the apparatus of the consequent nature is unworkable; he does not argue that, if it *were* workable, the two natures could be unified within one actual entity. His resolution is to cut the knot rather than to untie it. For our purposes this is instructive: it confirms that the unity-problem is not a parochial worry. A serious reader of Whitehead, given the choice between accepting an unworkable unity and eliminating one pole entirely, has been willing to choose elimination. The problem is not merely interpretive housekeeping; it has cost the process tradition one of its founding voices.

2.5 The Common Residue

Four responses, four different evasions of the same formal problem. Ford historicizes it: the consequent nature is a late insertion, and Whitehead never had time to integrate it. Hartshorne dissolves it: God is a society, not a single concrete entity (only an abstract unity), and the question of unity-in-dipolarity within a single entity does not arise. Griffin softens it: the dipolarity is real but not strictly numerical, so the antitheses describe a complex divinity rather than an internally articulated one. Sherburne refuses it: the consequent nature is unworkable, and the cleanest move is to remove God from the system altogether.

What none of them provides is what the text of *Process and Reality* itself seems to demand: a formal account, internal to a single actual entity, of how two natures whose characteristics are mutually opposed—permanent and fluent, one and many, eminently actual and eminently lacking—can be predicated of one being without contradiction and without collapsing into mere conjunction. The antitheses of PR 348 are statements *about* such a unity. They are not themselves an analysis of it. Nearly a century of process scholarship has circled the same gap.

This is the conceptual space the present paper aims to enter. The claim is not that Whitehead's text contains a hidden formal resolution that better hermeneutics will recover; ninety years of careful reading have not found one, and there is no reason to expect a ninety-first to succeed where the others have failed. The claim, rather, is that the *logical structure* the unity-problem requires—a relation that is neither identity nor difference, neither numerical sameness nor mere conjunction—has been formally articulated elsewhere. The seventh-century Korean Buddhist commentator Wŏnhyo (617–686), reading the

Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith, names this relation *pi-il pi-i* (*pur-il pur-i*, non-identity-non-difference) and develops it precisely to answer a structurally analogous problem: how the *ālayavijñāna* can be both the unborn-and-unceasing (*pulsaeng pulmyōl*) and the arising-and-ceasing (*saengmyōl*) without collapse into either pole and without disintegration into mere conjunction. The next section reconstructs Wŏnhyo's analysis, and the section after that argues that the resulting logical structure is the one Whitehead's antitheses formally require.

3. Wŏnhyo's Logic of Non-Identity-Non-Difference

The argument of this section is that the formal relation Whitehead's antitheses presuppose—but do not analyze—has been the explicit object of seventh-century Korean Buddhist commentarial work. The text in question is not exotic. It is the central document of East Asian *Tathāgatagarbha* thought, the *Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith* (*Dasheng qixin lun*), and the commentator is Wŏnhyo (617–686), whose two surviving exegeses—the *Taesŭng kisillon so* ("Commentary on the *Awakening of Faith*") and the *Taesŭng kisillon pyŏlgi* ("Expository Notes")—are widely regarded as the most philosophically searching readings of the text in the East Asian tradition.⁶ My claim is restricted. It is not that Wŏnhyo had Whitehead's problem in view, which would be anachronistic, nor that the *Awakening of Faith* and *Process and Reality* are versions of the same metaphysics, which would be promiscuous. The claim is that Wŏnhyo's analysis of the relation between two structurally opposed aspects of one ultimate reality—the unconditioned and the conditioned, the unborn-and-unceasing and the arising-and-ceasing—develops a formal apparatus that can be brought to bear on the unity-problem Whitehead bequeathed to the process tradition. Section 4 will argue that this transposition succeeds; the present section reconstructs the apparatus on its own ground.

⁶ Wŏnhyo, *Taesŭng kisillon so*, T44, no. 1844; *Taesŭng kisillon pyŏlgi*, T44, no. 1845. Modern Korean translation, critical edition, and study: Ŭn Chŏnghŭi, *Wŏnhyo ŭi Taesŭng kisillon so pyŏlgi* [Wŏnhyo's Commentary and Notes on the Awakening of Faith]. All translations from Wŏnhyo's Chinese in the present section follow Ŭn's Korean rendering as a guide, with my own English translation. Korean is romanized throughout this paper according to the McCune-Reischauer system, Chinese according to pinyin; the Korean text and Chinese original are reproduced in Kwŏn Sŏyong, "Wŏnhyo" [A Comparative Study on the Intersections between Wŏnhyo and Whitehead's Thought].

3.1 The Canonical Passage: The Unborn-and-Unceasing in Harmonization with the Arising-and-Ceasing

The text Wŏnhyo is reading runs as follows:

As for what arises and ceases (in the mind): depending on the *tathāgatagarbha*, there is a mind of arising-and-ceasing. The unborn-and-unceasing and what arises-and-ceases are harmonized (*hwahap*), not-one and not-different (*pi-il pi-i*); this is named the *ālayavijñāna*. This consciousness has two meanings: it embraces all *dharmas* and gives rise to all *dharmas*. What are the two? The first is the meaning of awareness; the second is the meaning of non-awareness. (Paramartha 576b; quoted in Kwon, “Wonhyo” 25)

Three features of this passage demand attention before we turn to Wŏnhyo's gloss on it.

First, the two terms that are being put into relation—the unborn-and-unceasing (*pulsaeng pulmyŏl*) and the arising-and-ceasing (*saengmyŏl*)—are *contradictories* in the strictest sense. To be unborn and unceasing is to be outside the order of arising-and-ceasing; to be subject to arising-and-ceasing is to fail to be unborn-and-unceasing. The *Awakening of Faith* is not pairing two compatible attributes; it is naming the two poles of the most basic Buddhist metaphysical contrast, that between the unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*) and the conditioned (*saṃskṛta*).

Second, the relation between these two contradictories is named by two formulas in immediate succession: *hwahap* (harmonization, conjoining) and *pi-il pi-i* (not-one, not-different). The first formula gives the *fact* of the relation: the two poles are conjoined in one phenomenon. The second formula gives the *form* of the relation: the conjunction is not identity, and it is not separateness. The doctrinal weight of the passage rests on the second formula's negative double specification.

Third, the entity that bears this relation is named: the *ālayavijñāna*. It is one consciousness, not two, that is both unborn-and-unceasing and arising-and-ceasing. A reading on which the *ālayavijñāna* is bifurcated into a permanent compartment and a momentary compartment would not be a reading of this passage at all; it would be a flat refusal of the non-identity-non-difference specification, which has been put in place precisely to rule out that reading (see Pak as cited and discussed in Kwon, “Wonhyo” 20).

This is the formal problem the *Awakening of Faith* hands to its commentators.

How can one consciousness be both unconditioned and conditioned? Identity is excluded by the contradictoriness of the predicates. Difference is excluded by the unity of the subject. What remains is a relation that is neither.

3.2 Wŏnhyo's First Gloss: Dependence Without Collapse

Wŏnhyo's commentary on this passage works the problem from the side of dependence:

At the beginning, where it says "depending on the *tathāgatagarbha*, there is a mind of arising-and-ceasing": the intrinsically pure mind (*chasŏng ch'ŏngjŏngsim*) is named the *tathāgatagarbha*. When, on account of the wind of ignorance (*mumyŏng*), there arises the activity of arising-and-ceasing, this is described as arising-and-ceasing depending on the *tathāgatagarbha*. So the four-fascicle *Laṅkāvatāra* says: the *tathāgatagarbha*, perfumed by beginningless evil habits, is named the *viññāna*-storehouse (*sikchang*); and again it says: that which is *kṣaṇa* (*ch'alla*, the momentary) is named the *viññāna*-storehouse.⁷

Two moves in this passage are decisive. First, Wŏnhyo identifies the unborn-and-unceasing pole with the *intrinsically pure mind*, glossed as *tathāgatagarbha*. The unconditioned, in other words, is not an abstract or external eternity; it is the intrinsic luminosity of mind itself, treated as a permanent ground that nonetheless remains the mind in its own nature. Second, the conditioned pole—the arising-and-ceasing—is described not as something *other than* the *tathāgatagarbha* but as the activity of the *tathāgatagarbha* under the modifying condition of ignorance. The arising-and-ceasing is not an autonomous second thing that gets *added to* the pure mind; it is the pure mind *as moved by* the wind of ignorance.

The first move secures non-difference: the conditioned pole has no independent ontological standing apart from the unconditioned ground. The second move secures non-identity: the conditioned pole, although ontologically dependent on the unconditioned, has its own distinguishable character (it is moved, it arises, it ceases) that the unconditioned (which is unmoved, unborn, unceasing) does not have. The not-one clause and the not-

⁷ Wŏnhyo, *Taesŏng kisillon so*, T44, no. 1844, glossing the *sim saengmyŏl* passage of T32 no. 1666, 576b. Chinese text as reproduced in Kwŏn, "Wŏnhyo," 25 n. 30. English translation mine, in consultation with Ŭn's Korean rendering.

different clause are not arbitrary equipoise. They are two distinct claims, each carrying a determinate philosophical weight, that *together* characterize the relation between the two aspects of the *ālayavijñāna*.

The closing citation of the *Laṅkāvatāra* should not be overlooked. Wōnhyo here brings the discussion of the *ālayavijñāna* into direct contact with the language of *kṣaṇa*—the canonical Buddhist technical term for the momentary. The four-fascicle *Laṅkāvatāra*, on Wōnhyo's report, treats the *vijñāna*-storehouse itself as *kṣaṇa*. This means the conditioned pole of the *ālayavijñāna* is not merely changeable in some loose sense; it is *momentary* in the technical sense central to *kṣaṇikavāda* (*ch'allamyoŏsŏl*), the Buddhist doctrine of momentariness.⁸ The unborn-and-unceasing pole, by contrast, is precisely that which falls outside the order of *kṣaṇa*—that which is not momentary. We will return to this in section 5, where qualified momentariness is identified as the metaphysical ground of the entire structure. For the moment, the point is that the two poles of the *ālayavijñāna* are not simply "the eternal" and "the temporal" in a vague way; they are the *non-momentary* and the *momentary* under a sharply formal analysis of time itself.

3.3 Wōnhyo's Second Gloss: The Two Gates of One Mind

The non-identity-non-difference relation is more fully systematized when Wōnhyo turns to the opening structural formula of the *Awakening of Faith: ūi ilsimpŏp yu ijongmun* ("depending on the dharma of One Mind, there are two kinds of gates"). Wōnhyo writes:

Where it says at the outset, "depending on the dharma of One Mind, there are two kinds of gates": this is as the *Laṅkāvatāra* says, "what is tranquil-and-extinct (*chŏngmyŏl*) is named the One Mind, and the One Mind is named the *tathāgatagarbha*." Here, the Gate of Mind-as-Suchness (*sim chinyŏ mun*) explicates the *Laṅkāvatāra*'s claim that "what is tranquil-and-extinct is named the One Mind." The Gate of Mind-as-Arising-and-Ceasing (*sim saengmyŏl mun*) explicates the *Laṅkāvatāra*'s claim that "the One Mind is named the *tathāgatagarbha*." Why so? Because all *dharma*s are without arising and ceasing, originally still, and

⁸For the standard analysis of *kṣaṇikavāda* in the Buddhist scholastic tradition, see Rospatt. The link Wōnhyo draws between the *vijñāna*-storehouse and *kṣaṇa* via the *Laṅkāvatāra* is the basis for reading the *ālayavijñāna*'s arising-and-ceasing pole as momentary in the technical sense; the implications are developed in section 5 below.

are only the One Mind—what is named in this way is the Gate of Mind-as-Suchness; hence "what is tranquil-and-extinct is named the One Mind." Again, because the very substance of this One Mind has Original Awareness (*pon'gak*) and yet, on account of ignorance, moves into the activity of arising-and-ceasing—therefore in this Gate the nature of the Tathāgata is hidden and does not manifest, and is named the *tathāgatagarbha*.⁹

The structural claim is concentrated in the phrase *ūi ilsimpōp yu ijongmun*—*depending on the dharma of One Mind, there are two kinds of gates*. The crucial preposition is *ūi* ("depending on"). The Two Gates are not *parts* of the One Mind, as compartments of a single container; if they were parts, they would be different from the One Mind and from each other in the way ordinary parts of a whole are, and the not-different specification would fail. The Two Gates are also not *identical with* the One Mind, as exhaustive equivalents; if they were, there would be no analytical reason to distinguish them, and the not-one specification would fail. They are gates *depending on* the One Mind—modes of access to, or descriptions of, the single underlying reality, neither identical with it nor separable from it.

Pak T'aewŏn, the contemporary Korean philosopher of religion who has analyzed this structure most carefully, draws out the consequence. The One Mind, in Wŏnhyo's reading, is the *upper concept* (*sangwi kaenyŏm*) of the Two Gates: each Gate "belongs to" the One Mind in the sense that the One Mind is presupposed by it, but the Two Gates do not exhaust the One Mind in the sense of being substitutable for it.¹⁰ The relation, in modern logical vocabulary, is something like the relation between a sortal concept and the modes under which it is correctly applied: the modes are not the concept and the concept is

⁹ Wŏnhyo, *Taesŭng kisillon so*, T44, no. 1844, glossing *ūi ilsimpōp yu ijongmun*. Chinese text as reproduced in Kwŏn, "Wŏnhyo," 19, n. 19. English translation mine, in consultation with Ūn's Korean rendering. The internal citation to the *Lañkāvatāra* ("what is tranquil-and-extinct is named the One Mind; the One Mind is named the *tathāgatagarbha*") is Wŏnhyo's own, and it functions in his commentary as the textual anchor for the One Mind / Two Gates structure.

¹⁰ Pak, *Taesŭng kisillon sasang yŏn'gu* 1, 118: "Wŏnhyo's understanding of the One Mind here is clearly a higher concept that contains the Two Gates. Once the One Mind is presupposed, then within that One Mind the aspect that is without arising-and-ceasing, originally tranquil, only suchness itself, is called the Gate of Mind-as-Suchness; the aspect in which the One Mind, by ignorance, comes to arise-and-cease is distinguished as the Gate of Mind-as-Arising-and-Ceasing." Korean original quoted in Kwŏn, "Wŏnhyo," 20 n. 20.

not any mode, but the concept is what makes the modes the modes that they are.

What Wŏnhyo has done, then, is to specify a *formal apparatus*—the apparatus of *ñi* (dependence-without-identity)—that does precisely what the non-identity-non-difference formula requires the relation between the unconditioned and the conditioned to do. The Gates *depend on* the One Mind without *being* the One Mind, and they are *not separable from* the One Mind without *being identical to* it. The non-identity-non-difference is not, on this reading, an exotic mystical formula; it is the explicit characterization of a relation that bears specifiable logical features. Two aspects, one ground, dependence-without-identity, distinction-without-separation: this is the structure.

3.4 The Operative Verb: *Kae imun ō ilsim* (“to open the Two Gates within the One Mind”)

The most concentrated articulation of the structure occurs in Wŏnhyo's prologue to the *Kŭmgang sammaegyŏng non* (“Treatise on the *Vajrasamādhi Sūtra*”). Here Wŏnhyo writes, in language that has become canonical in Korean Buddhist scholarship: “To open the Two Gates within the One Mind, gathering up the wide pronouncements of all the *māras* by the hundred and eight.”¹¹

The verb *kae* (“to open”) is doing the philosophical work. The Two Gates are *opened within* (ō) the One Mind. They are not added to the One Mind from outside; they are not pre-existing compartments that the analysis happens to discover; they are *opened*—made available for analytical use—by the structural operation of distinguishing the unborn-and-unceasing aspect from the arising-and-ceasing aspect of one and the same reality. The opening produces *distinctions* but not *separations*: what is opened can also be *hap* (“joined back together”), as Wŏnhyo's *kaehap* (“opening-and-joining”) logic makes explicit elsewhere in the text: “Spoken in the mode of joining, the single-flavor contemplative practice is essential; spoken in the mode of opening, the ten-layered dharma-gates are

¹¹ Wŏnhyo, *Kŭmgang sammaegyŏng non*, *Taeñi* (“General Meaning”); *Han'guk Pulgyo chŏnsŏ* (hereafter HPC), vol. 1. The passage is canonical in modern Korean studies of Wŏnhyo and is reproduced in standard scholarly editions.

the principle.”¹²

The *kaehap* logic is structurally identical to the non-identity-non-difference logic. *Joining* (*hap*) is what one says about the One Mind under the aspect of its unity; *opening* (*kae*) is what one says about the One Mind under the aspect of its analytical articulation. Joining-without-identity-collapse, opening-without-separation-into-two: the same formal structure governs both descriptions. The relation between joining and opening is itself an instance of non-identity-non-difference.

This is, I want to emphasize, a *formal* result. Wŏnhyo has not merely asserted that the One Mind has two aspects and gestured at their mysterious unity; he has analyzed the unity in terms of a specifiable relational structure (*ui*, dependence) that itself admits of two complementary operational descriptions (*kae* and *hap*) that stand to each other in the very same non-identity-non-difference relation that they are introduced to characterize. The recursion is not vicious. It is the mark of a structure that has been correctly identified as fundamental.

3.5 Critical Considerations

Before turning in section 4 to the comparative use of this apparatus, three critical points should be registered. First, the non-identity-non-difference formula is not unique to Wŏnhyo. It appears in the *Awakening of Faith* itself, in Madhyamaka literature, and in various Yogācāra texts. What is distinctive about Wŏnhyo's treatment is the *systematic role* the formula plays in his commentarial architecture, not the formula's bare occurrence. To say that Wŏnhyo "develops" the non-identity-non-difference logic is therefore to say something specific: it is to say that he treats this formula as the central structural specification of the unity of the *ālayavijñāna*'s two aspects, and that he builds the rest of his commentary out from this specification. Other commentators—Fazang in China, for example—work the same passages without giving the non-identity-non-difference formula the same central position. The contribution this article draws on is Wŏnhyo's *systematization*, not a discovery

¹² Wŏnhyo, *Kūmgang sammaegyōng non*, Chongyo ("Essential Doctrine"); HPC vol. 1. For the *kaehap* (opening-joining) logic as a hallmark of Wŏnhyo's exegetical method, see Pak, 1, as discussed in Kwŏn, "Wŏnhyo."

he made *de novo*.¹³

Second, the non-identity-non-difference formula has classical Indian analogues. The closest is the Madhyamaka use of the *catuṣkoṭi* (tetralemma) to deny that two things are identical, different, both, or neither; the second closest is the Advaita Vedānta relation between *nirguṇa* and *saguṇa* Brahman, characterized as *ananyatva* ("not-otherness"). The differences matter. Madhyamaka *catuṣkoṭi* is a soteriological negation of all four modal options; it does not specify a positive structural relation but withholds commitment from all the options it lists. Advaita *ananyatva* is closer in spirit but operates within a strict two-truth metaphysics in which one of the relata (the phenomenal world) is finally illusory. Wŏnhyo's non-identity-non-difference, by contrast, is *positively* specifying a relation that both relata genuinely instantiate without dissolving either pole. This is, formally, what is needed for the Whiteheadian application: neither pole of God's nature is dispensable, and the relation between them must be a positive one, not a negation or a denial.

Third, the apparatus is not a theological apparatus. It was developed to address a problem in Yogācāra-*Tathāgatagarbha* metaphysics—how the *ālayavijñāna* can be both the seat of impurity and the storehouse of the *tathāgatagarbha*. It was not developed to address a problem about the unity of God's two natures. The legitimacy of transposing it to Whitehead's problem depends not on a thesis about hidden agreement between two traditions but on a thesis about *formal* transferability: the question is whether the relational structure Wŏnhyo specifies (non-identity, non-difference, dependence-without-collapse, opening-and-joining) is the *same kind* of structure that Whitehead's antitheses presuppose. That question is the subject of section 4.

4. The Structural Homology: *PR* 348 as Non-Identity-Non-Difference

This section argues that Whitehead's antitheses at *Process and Reality* 348 instantiate the formal relation Wŏnhyo specifies as non-identity-non-difference, and that reading the antitheses through this specification supplies what Whitehead's text gestures toward but does not analyze. The argument is structural, not doctrinal. The claim is not that Whitehead's God and Wŏnhyo's

¹³ Fazang's *Awakening of Faith* commentary, the *Daseng Qixinlun Yiji*, works the same passages but emphasizes the One-Vehicle (*ilsŭng*) doctrinal framework rather than the non-identity-non-difference structural specification. For comparative analysis of Wŏnhyo's commentarial method against Fazang's, see the discussions in modern Korean Wŏnhyo scholarship, including Kim Sanghyŏn.

One Mind are the same entity under different names—they manifestly are not—but that the *relation* Whitehead's text needs to obtain between God's two natures has the same formal shape as the relation Wŏnhyo's commentary specifies between the *ālayavijñāna*'s two aspects. If the formal shape is the same, then the formal apparatus that has been developed within one tradition can do analytic work for an unanswered problem within the other.

I will proceed in four steps. Section 4.1 returns to PR 348 and isolates what Whitehead's antitheses *formally require*. Section 4.2 sets out the four formal features of Wŏnhyo's non-identity-non-difference logic that respond, point for point, to those requirements. Section 4.3 faces what is, in my view, the most serious objection to this transposition. Section 4.4 states what the homology accomplishes and, equally important, what it does not.

4.1 What the Antitheses Formally Require

The full passage of PR 348, with the prefatory sentence that frames it, runs as follows:

In each antithesis there is a shift of meaning which converts the opposition into a contrast.

It is as true to say that God is permanent and the World fluent, as that the World is permanent and God is fluent.

It is as true to say that God is one and the World many, as that the World is one and God many.

It is as true to say that, in comparison with the World, God is actual eminently, as that, in comparison with God, the World is actual eminently.

It is as true to say that the World is immanent in God, as that God is immanent in the World.

It is as true to say that God transcends the World, as that the World transcends God.

It is as true to say that God creates the World, as that the World creates God.¹⁴

Five formal features of this passage must be held together before any analysis of its content begins.

First, the antitheses are not statements about *predicates* that are equally true. They are statements about *symmetrical pairs of statements* that are equally true. "God is permanent and the World fluent" and "the World is permanent and God is fluent" are not two compatible predicates of one subject; they are two complete propositions whose joint truth is asserted. Whatever relation makes both members of each pair true must be a relation that can support the apparent contradiction *between* the members.

Second, the framing sentence explicitly denies that the apparent contradictions are real contradictions. There is, Whitehead says, "a shift of meaning which converts the opposition into a contrast."¹⁵ The reader is told *that* the opposition is a contrast but not, in this passage, *how* the conversion is effected. The shift of meaning is named but not analyzed. The entire formal weight of the antitheses is parked on a verb—"converts"—and a category—"contrast"—whose specification is left unstated.

Third, the two natures of God—primordial and consequent—are the implicit grammatical subjects on the divine side of each antithesis. The pairs that include "God is permanent" and "God is fluent" do not predicate inconsistent properties of the same entity at the same time and in the same respect; they predicate properties of God under different aspects. The "shift of meaning" Whitehead invokes is a shift between aspects: God as primordial (and so permanent, one, eminently actual in the conceptual order, transcendent, creative) and God as consequent (and so fluent, many, eminently actual in the responsive order, immanent, created).

Fourth, the symmetry between God and World is *strict*. The antitheses do not say that the divine side and the worldly side are *analogically* related; they say that *the same predicates apply* to both, with the assignments swapping between the

¹⁴ Whitehead, PR 348. I have reproduced six of the seven antitheses, which is what Whitehead presents in this passage; the prefatory sentence about the "shift of meaning" precedes them on the same page.

¹⁵ Whitehead, PR 348. The full prefatory sentence reads: "In each antithesis there is a shift of meaning which converts the opposition into a contrast." The verb "converts" carries the philosophical burden of the passage; it names an operation whose formal specification is left to the reader.

members of each pair. This rules out any classical theology of analogy on which God is permanent in a *unique* sense and the World fluent in another. It also rules out an ontologically subordinate position for the World, since "in comparison with God, the World is actual eminently" is asserted with the same force as its converse.

Fifth, and most importantly, the relation between God and World that the antitheses presuppose must be one that *makes the swaps coherent*. If the relation were strict identity (God and World are the same actual entity), then the antitheses would collapse into tautologies; "God is permanent" and "God is fluent" would be claims about the same subject in the same respect and would be straightforwardly contradictory. If the relation were strict difference (God and World are distinct actual entities with no internal communion), then the antitheses would be false; "God creates the World" would have no symmetrical counterpart, because nothing in the World's distinct being would explain how it could create God. The antitheses *require* a relation that is neither.¹⁶

This is the formal point. *PR* 348 presupposes—and Whitehead's framing sentence asserts—a relation between God and World, and *correlatively* between God's primordial and consequent natures, that is neither identity nor difference. Whitehead does not analyze this relation. He uses it. The reader is left to supply the analysis.

The four responses surveyed in section 2 each refuse the analysis in a different direction. Ford does not even attempt one: on his stratigraphic reading, the antitheses are a *late* insertion whose integration into the rest of the system was never completed. Hartshorne *substitutes* an analysis: God is a society, not an actual entity, and the antitheses describe abstract characters across a divine series. Griffin *loosens* the analysis: dipolarity is real but not strictly numerical, so the antitheses describe a complex but not internally articulated divine reality. Sherburne *refuses* the analysis: if the relation cannot be specified, drop one of the relata. None of these is a formal analysis of what Whitehead's text presupposes. The space for such an analysis is open.

¹⁶ This is not a controversial point among Whitehead scholars; what is controversial is what analysis of the required relation should look like. For three different attempted analyses, see Cobb; Christian, ch. 18; and Leclerc, ch. 21. None of these analyses, in my judgment, captures what *PR* 348 formally requires.

4.2 What Non-Identity-Non-Difference Supplies

Wōnhyo's apparatus, reconstructed in section 3, was developed to characterize the relation between the *ālayavijñāna*'s two aspects: the unborn-and-unceasing (the *tathāgatagarbha* pole) and the arising-and-ceasing (the *vijñāna*-storehouse pole). The relation, on Wōnhyo's analysis, has four formal features that I now match, point for point, against the requirements isolated in section 4.1.

First, the relation specifies that the two aspects are not identical — the not-one clause. This corresponds, in Wōnhyo's framework, to the *predicate-asymmetry* between the two poles: the unborn-and-unceasing pole bears predicates (still, originally tranquil, unmoving) that the arising-and-ceasing pole does not bear, and conversely. The reason the two cannot be identical is *not* that they are two different things; it is that *their characteristic predicates are mutually exclusive*. The not-one clause is grounded in the same kind of predicate-incompatibility that grounds Whitehead's antitheses: permanent versus fluent, one versus many, eminently actual versus eminently lacking. The structural shape of the non-identity is identical.

Second, the relation specifies that the two aspects are not different—the not-different clause. This corresponds, in Wōnhyo's framework, to the *subject-unity* of the *ālayavijñāna*: the two aspects are not two different entities that happen to be in communion; they are the same consciousness *under two structurally distinct modes of analysis*. The reason the two cannot be different is *not* that they are identical; it is that they share a single subject of predication. The not-different clause is grounded in the *unity of the bearer*, just as Whitehead's antitheses are grounded in the unity of God: it is *God* who is permanent and fluent, *God* who is one and many, *God* who creates and is created. The structural shape of the non-difference is identical.

Third, the relation supplies a positive specification—dependence-without-collapse—for how the two aspects can be co-asserted of one subject. Wōnhyo's analysis is that the arising-and-ceasing pole *depends on* (iii) the unborn-and-unceasing pole as its ground, in such a way that the conditioned pole has no independent ontological standing apart from the unconditioned, but the unconditioned pole does not *exhaust* the conditioned—the conditioned has features (movement, arising, ceasing) that the unconditioned lacks. This is, formally, what Whitehead's "shift of meaning...converts the opposition into a contrast" needs to mean. The "shift" is a shift *between aspects of one subject*, where each aspect *depends on the other* for its sense without *being the other*. God's consequent nature is not intelligible

apart from the primordial nature (it is the consequent *of* what?); God's primordial nature is not actual without the consequent (it is, in Whitehead's own language, "deficient in actuality" without physical prehensions).¹⁷ The dependence-without-collapse structure that Wŏnhyo specifies as *ni* is the structure Whitehead's antitheses *require* their relation to have.

Fourth, the relation admits of two complementary operational descriptions—opening (kae) and joining (hap)—which themselves stand to each other in the same non-identity-non-difference relation. This is the recursive feature that I drew attention to in section 3.4, and it has a direct Whiteheadian analogue. The primordial and consequent natures of God can be described under the aspect of their *distinction* (the antitheses' work of contrasting them) or under the aspect of their *unity* (Whitehead's repeated insistence that God is one actual entity).¹⁸ These two descriptions are themselves neither identical (distinction and unity are not the same operation) nor different (they characterize the same dipolar God). The recursion is not vicious in Wŏnhyo's case because it is the mark of a structure that has been correctly identified as fundamental; and it is not vicious in Whitehead's case for the same reason.

The four-point match is not, I want to be precise, a claim that Whitehead's text *contains* Wŏnhyo's analysis hidden within itself. The historical evidence Ford has marshalled tells against any such claim: the antitheses are a late insertion into a text whose formal apparatus was not built to absorb them.¹⁹ The match is rather a claim about *what relational structure Whitehead's text formally requires for its antitheses to be coherent at all*, and *what relational structure Wŏnhyo's commentary explicitly specifies*. The two structures are the same. The transposition is not invention; it is recognition.

¹⁷ Whitehead, *PR* 343 (primordial nature as "deficient in actuality"), *PR* 345 (consequent nature as "physical prehension of the actualities of the evolving universe"). The mutual dependence of the two natures is Whitehead's own doctrine; what is missing in Whitehead is a formal account of the *kind* of dependence at issue.

¹⁸ Whitehead, *PR* 343, where the threefold character of God (primordial, consequent, superjective) is presented under the assumption that God is one actual entity to which all three apply.

¹⁹ Ford, "Some Proposals," stage [m]. The historical observation does not diminish the philosophical task; if anything, it sharpens it. A text whose formal apparatus was *not* built to absorb dipolar divinity needs *more* analytical reconstruction, not less.

4.3 The Objection from Foreignness

The most serious objection to this transposition runs as follows. The non-identity-non-difference logic was developed within a Buddhist framework in which the *ālayavijñāna* is a feature of *individual consciousness*—a storehouse of seeds, a substrate of cognition. Whitehead's God is a *cosmic actual entity* whose primordial nature includes the envisagement of all eternal objects and whose consequent nature prehends the entire physical world. To take a structure developed for the analysis of individual mind and apply it to the analysis of cosmic divinity is to commit a category mistake. The two *relata* of Wōnhyo's apparatus are not the kind of thing the two natures of God are. Therefore, the formal apparatus does not transfer.

This objection deserves a careful response. I grant the premise: the *relata* are different. The *ālayavijñāna* is not God, and God is not the *ālayavijñāna*. But the conclusion does not follow. The claim of formal homology is precisely a claim about relations, not *relata*. Formal homology requires that *the relation* between the two terms have the same logical features, not that *the terms themselves* be the same kind of thing. To see this, consider an uncontroversial example. The relation of strict numerical identity has the same formal properties (reflexivity, symmetry, transitivity) whether the *relata* are propositions, sets, persons, or moments of consciousness. To use the formal apparatus of identity in different domains is not a category mistake; it is the standard practice of any rigorous discipline.

The objection has force only if it can be shown that the *formal properties* of Wōnhyo's non-identity-non-difference relation depend on *substantive features* of the *ālayavijñāna* that do not carry over to Whitehead's God. The substantive features in question would be something like: that the bearer of the two aspects is a consciousness, that ignorance is the modifying condition that produces the arising-and-ceasing pole, that the goal of analysis is soteriological (escape from suffering). I grant that all of these are substantive features of Wōnhyo's framework. I deny that any of them are constitutive of the *formal* relation non-identity-non-difference as such. The formal relation says: two aspects, one subject, predicate-incompatibility between the aspects, unity through dependence-without-collapse, complementary operational descriptions standing in the same relation to each other. None of these specifications mentions consciousness, ignorance, or soteriology. They are abstractable from the Buddhist substantive frame in precisely the way logical features are

abstractable from any particular domain of application.²⁰

I should be candid about the limit of this response. The claim that the formal relation is fully separable from the substantive Buddhist frame is, in this article, asserted with more confidence than it is argued. A fuller defense would need to show, in Wŏnhyo's own commentary, that the non-identity-non-difference specification can be made without essential reference to ignorance, soteriology, or consciousness-as-such—and that the specifications I have extracted (predicate-incompatibility, subject-unity, dependence-without-collapse, opening-and-joining) are intelligible in cases that lie wholly outside the Buddhist substantive context. I have not, in this article, been able to provide that fuller defense. What I can say is that the standard methodological objection to cross-tradition formal transfer—that it imports substantive content under cover of formal parallels—does not apply to the present case so long as the four formal features I have identified are doing the analytical work, and so long as the verdict of the analysis (the unity-problem is tractable, requires no revision of Whitehead's text, admits of a formally specifiable solution) does not depend on the import of any specifically Buddhist substantive content. Whether the response succeeds is, in the end, something each reader will need to weigh; the methodological commitment of this article is to make the analysis precise enough that the weighing can be done on its merits.

4.4 What the Homology Accomplishes

It is worth being clear, at the end of the argument, about what the structural homology accomplishes and what it does not. What it accomplishes, first, is to fill the analytical gap in Whitehead's text that nearly a century of process scholarship has been unable to close on its own terms. The "shift of meaning... converts the opposition into a contrast" of PR 348 has, until now, been a verbal placeholder rather than a formal specification. With the non-identity-non-difference apparatus in hand, the placeholder can be replaced: the shift of

²⁰ The principle that formal relational structures can be analyzed independently of the substantive contexts in which they are first articulated is familiar from the philosophy of mathematics and logic, where structures such as groups, equivalence relations, and partial orders are routinely transferred across domains. The methodological question for comparative philosophy is whether the same principle applies to formal *metaphysical* relations. This paper proceeds on the assumption that it does, while acknowledging that the assumption is contested in the broader comparative philosophy literature.

meaning that converts opposition to contrast is the shift between two aspects of one actual entity standing in the relation of dependence-without-collapse. The antitheses become not merely paradoxes the reader is asked to accept on Whitehead's authority but consequences of a formally specifiable relation that the text presupposes throughout.

What it accomplishes, second, is to reframe the disputes among Ford, Hartshorne, Griffin, and Sherburne. Each of these positions, I suggested in section 2, evaded the unity-problem in a different direction. With a formal analysis of the unity in hand, the evasions can be re-described. Hartshorne's society-of-occasions move appears now as an unnecessary substitution: the formal apparatus needed to support the unity of a single dipolar actual entity is available, so the substitution is not forced. Griffin's softening of dipolarity into asymmetric complexity appears as a substantive retreat that no longer has formal warrant. Sherburne's elimination of God appears as a response to a problem (the incoherence of one God-in-two-natures) that turns out to be tractable. Ford's historical thesis—that the consequent nature was a late insertion—survives intact, but it now describes a textual fact rather than a philosophical defeat. Whitehead may not have integrated the consequent nature *in the historical composition of his text*. The non-identity-non-difference apparatus shows how it can be integrated *in the philosophical reconstruction of his system*.

What the homology does *not* accomplish should also be stated. It does not show that Whitehead's God is the *ālayavijñāna* or vice versa. The two are not the same metaphysical entity. It does not show that Buddhism and process theology share a metaphysics; they do not. It does not show that Whitehead was unconsciously a Buddhist or that Wŏnhyo would have endorsed Whitehead's cosmic divinity; neither claim is plausible, and neither is needed for the argument. The argument is narrower and, I think, more interesting than these grander comparative claims. It is the claim that a specific formal problem in *one* tradition admits of a formal resolution from *another*, and that the resolution requires no importation of substantive metaphysics.

There is one further consequence of the homology that the next section, section 5, develops. The relation non-identity-non-difference is, on Wŏnhyo's reading, *grounded* in a metaphysics of qualified momentariness: the conditioned pole is momentary in the technical sense of *kṣaṇa*, the unconditioned pole is not. If the formal homology between the two natures of Whitehead's God and the two aspects of Wŏnhyo's *ālayavijñāna* holds, then the *same* metaphysical

ground is available on the Whiteheadian side. Whitehead's consequent nature, on this reading, is not merely *temporal* in a loose sense; it is *momentary* in the technical sense that makes process metaphysics what it is—composed of perishing actual occasions whose unity is reconstituted at each moment. The primordial nature is correspondingly *not* momentary. The dipolar structure of God thus has the same metaphysical signature as the dipolar structure of the *ālayavijñāna*: qualified momentariness, momentary for the conditioned pole, non-momentary for the unconditioned ground. The next section makes this explicit.

5. Qualified Momentariness as the Metaphysical Ground

The argument so far has been formal. PR 348 requires a relation of the non-identity-non-difference type to make its antitheses coherent; Wŏnhyo's commentary on the *Awakening of Faith* supplies a worked-out specification of just such a relation; the transposition succeeds because formal homology requires sameness of relation, not sameness of relata. What remains to be shown is that the formal homology has a *metaphysical* underwriting—that the *same* metaphysical commitment supports the non-identity-non-difference relation in Wŏnhyo's framework and the unity-in-dipolarity in Whitehead's. The commitment in question is what I will call *qualified momentariness*: the thesis that the conditioned pole of reality is radically momentary in a technical sense, while the unconditioned pole is not.

This section makes three claims. First (section 5.1), the technical distinction between *full-blown* and *qualified momentarism*—developed within Buddhist scholasticism but applicable beyond it—supplies the metaphysical category under which both Wŏnhyo's One Mind and Whitehead's dipolar God can be classified. Second (sections 5.2–5.3), each thinker's bipolar structure is, on examination, an instance of this category. Third (section 5.4), the technical objection that Whitehead's actual occasion is *epochal* rather than *instantaneous*, and so cannot be assimilated to the Buddhist *kleśāṇa*, can be answered once the relevant Buddhist scholastic debates are taken into account: *kleśāṇa* itself is not univocally instantaneous in the Buddhist tradition, and the epochal character of Whitehead's actual occasion falls within the range of what *kleśāṇa* covers on the most careful analyses. Section 5.5 draws out what this metaphysical grounding accomplishes for the unity-problem.

5.1 Full-Blown and Qualified Momentariness

The distinction between *full-blown* and *qualified momentarism* is a technical distinction within Buddhist scholasticism whose general applicability has recently been argued in the comparative literature.²¹ I summarize here only what the present argument requires.

Full-blown momentarism is the position that *all* entities, without exception, are momentary insofar as they exist. The classical defense of this position is Dharmakīrti's *sattvānumāna* (existence-inference): to exist is to be capable of producing an effect, and entities that produce effects must do so instantaneously, since an enduring entity would produce its effect at every moment of its duration and so produce it infinitely many times.²² The argument, if successful, leaves no metaphysical room for any non-momentary entity. Even the unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*), on a strict reading of the full-blown position, must be either reinterpreted as a special kind of momentary phenomenon or denied actual existence.

Qualified momentarism is the position that some entities—typically a wide and philosophically important class—are momentary, while *some others* are not. The qualification is generally drawn along the conditioned/unconditioned line: conditioned phenomena (*saṃskṛta-dharma*), comprising mental events, sensible objects, and their causal interactions, are momentary in the strict technical sense; the unconditioned (*asaṃskṛta*), variously identified as *Dharmakāya*, *tathāgatagarbha*, *nirvāṇa*, or the intrinsic luminosity of mind, is not. The classical Buddhist defenses of qualified momentariness include the arguments from the nature of mind, from change, and from destruction, which establish the momentariness of a specifiable class of entities without committing to the universality of momentariness.²³

²¹ The full-blown / qualified momentarism distinction is developed extensively in Buddhist scholastic studies; the comparative work that brings the distinction to bear on cross-tradition analysis is more recent. For the Buddhist scholastic background, see Alexander von Rospatt and the literature cited there.

²² Dharmakīrti, *Pramāṇavārttika*, Svārthānumāna chapter; the *sattvānumāna* is most systematically developed in the *Hetubindu* and *Pramāṇaviniścaya*. For the standard scholarly treatment, see Steinkellner.

²³ For the four-argument typology, see von Rospatt 1–15. The first three arguments (from mind, change, destruction) can be read as establishing qualified positions in the sense developed here; the fourth (*sattvānumāna*) is what closes off the qualified option and produces full-blown momentariness.

The crucial point for present purposes is that *qualified momentariness is itself a Buddhist position*, not a non-Buddhist compromise. The *Tathāgatagarbha* tradition, the *Śrīmālā-sūtra*, the *Awakening of Mahāyāna Faith*, and Wŏnhyo's commentaries all hold qualified-momentarist views.²⁴ These traditions are not departing from Buddhism by holding that the *tathāgatagarbha* is non-momentary; they are *articulating* a Buddhist position that includes both poles. The reading on which Buddhism *as such* is committed to full-blown momentariness, and on which qualified positions are crypto-Vedāntic departures, is a polemical construction that recent scholarship has shown to be untenable.²⁵ What we are dealing with when we examine Wŏnhyo's analysis of the *alayavijñāna*, is a qualified-momentarist metaphysics articulated *internally* to the Buddhist tradition by one of its most rigorous commentators.

5.2 Wŏnhyo's One Mind under Qualified Momentariness

The non-identity-non-difference structure Wŏnhyo specifies for the relation between the *alayavijñāna*'s two aspects, on the reading developed in section 3, is grounded in this qualified-momentarist commitment. Recall the textual sequence. The arising-and-ceasing pole of the *alayavijñāna* is, in Wŏnhyo's *Commentary*, explicitly connected to the technical vocabulary of *kṣaṇa* via the four-fascicle *Laṅkāvatāra*: "again, what is *kṣaṇa*—the momentary—is named the *vijñāna*-storehouse."²⁶ The arising-and-ceasing of mind, that is, is not loose changeability; it is *kṣaṇa*-momentariness in the technical sense developed by the Yogācāra scholastic tradition. The unborn-and-unceasing pole (*tathāgatagarbha*), by contrast, is precisely that which does *not* fall under the *kṣaṇa* description. It is, in the *Śrīmālā-sūtra*'s standard formula, "permanent,

²⁴ For the *Tathāgatagarbha* tradition, see Wayman and Wayman; and Takasaki. For the *Awakening of Faith* and Wŏnhyo, see section 3 of the present paper, with citations to Ūn Chŏnghŭi and Pak T'aewŏn.

²⁵ The most decisive recent argument against the "Buddhism is full-blown momentarism *tout court*" reading is the recognition that the *Tathāgatagarbha* tradition is internally Buddhist and qualified-momentarist. For an explicit articulation of this point, see Williams in the chapters on *Tathāgatagarbha* and *Yogācāra*.

²⁶ Wŏnhyo, *Taesŏng kisillon so*, glossing the *sim saengmyŏl* passage. See section 3.2 of the present paper for the full passage and translation. The internal citation is to the four-fascicle *Laṅkāvatāra* (*Sagvŏn'gyŏng*), Guṇabhadra's fifth-century translation.

steadfast, tranquil, and eternal."²⁷

The qualified-momentarist structure is therefore exact: the conditioned pole is momentary, the unconditioned pole is not, and the unity of the *ālayavijñāna* is the unity of *these two poles within one consciousness*. The non-identity-non-difference relation between them does not float free of a metaphysical commitment; it is what the metaphysics of qualified momentariness *looks like* when articulated as a relation. Non-identity tracks the momentary/non-momentary contrast at the predicate level; non-difference tracks the metaphysical unity of the single bearer of both predicates; dependence-without-collapse tracks the metaphysical priority of the unconditioned ground over the conditioned activity it sustains.

What this means is that non-identity-non-difference is not a free-standing logical formula that one could redeploy in any context whatsoever. It is the formal articulation of a *specific metaphysical structure*: that of a single ultimate reality with a momentary conditioned aspect and a non-momentary unconditioned aspect. Where this metaphysical structure obtains, the non-identity-non-difference relation is available as its formal characterization. Where it does not, the formula has no application. The question that decides the transposition to Whitehead is therefore not whether *Process and Reality* uses the words "non-identity and non-difference"—it does not—but whether the metaphysical structure of qualified momentariness is in fact at work in Whitehead's dipolar God.

5.3 Whitehead's God under Qualified Momentariness

The case for reading Whitehead's God as a qualified-momentarist structure is, I think, strong. It rests on three considerations. First, Whitehead's metaphysics of actual occasions is itself an *atomistic* metaphysics in a sense that brings it very close to *kṣaṇa* metaphysics. Each actual occasion is a quantum of becoming that "perishes" upon the completion of its concrescence; the world is composed of these momentary entities; their succession is the substance of time.²⁸ What does *not* persist through time, in Whitehead's system, is *any actual*

²⁷ *Śrīmāla-sūtra*, in Wayman and Wayman, 98–103. The formula "permanent, steadfast, tranquil, eternal" (*nitya, dhruva, śiva, śāśvata*) is one of the most widely cited characterizations of the unconditioned Dharmakāya in the *Tathāgatagarbha* literature.

²⁸ PR 27, 29, 81, 137, 213. The locus classicus is the opening discussion of "the philosophy of organism" in Part I.

entity in its subjective immediacy. The cosmos is, just as in Buddhist *kṣanika* metaphysics, a flux of momentary actualities. The Korean Whitehead scholar Mun Ch'angok puts this point with admirable clarity: the actual occasion "does not itself contain physical time within itself" but stands in *temporal succession-relations* with other actual occasions; it arises at one moment and perishes at the next.²⁹ This is *kṣaṇa*-metaphysics in everything but name.

Second, Whitehead's God is, by Whitehead's own insistence, *not* an actual occasion in the way the actual occasions of the temporal world are. God is an actual entity, on Whitehead's terminology, but an actual entity that does not perish, an actual entity that "is always self-creating, and so always enjoys its subjective immediacy."³⁰ The non-perishing of God places God outside the order of *kṣaṇa*-momentariness in the precise sense that the unconditioned pole of Wŏnhyo's *ālayavijñāna* is outside the order of *kṣaṇa*-momentariness. God is, in Whitehead's system, the non-momentary actuality in a cosmos whose other actualities are radically momentary. The structure is qualified momentariness: momentary for the world's actual occasions, non-momentary for God.

Third, and most importantly, the *internal* dipolar structure of God recapitulates the same qualified-momentariness contrast that holds between God and the world. The primordial nature is described by Whitehead as "free, complete, primordial, eternal, actually deficient, and unconscious" (PR 345). The consequent nature is described as "determined, incomplete, consequent, 'everlasting,' fully actual, and conscious" (PR 345). The primordial nature is the unconditioned envisagement of all eternal objects; the consequent nature is the conditioned-and-conditioning physical prehension of the world's actual occasions. The consequent nature is what *responds* to the momentary actualities of the world; in doing so, it takes their momentariness up into itself, even as the divine actuality that bears the consequent nature does not itself perish.³¹

²⁹ Mun Ch'angok 103–104, as quoted in Kwŏn Sŏyong 453–480, at p. 460 n. 17.

³⁰ PR 32, 87–88. The non-perishing of God is one of the most decisive ways in which God is set apart from the actual occasions of the temporal world, and it is the central textual basis for the claim I am making here.

³¹ PR 351: the "fellow-sufferer who understands." The consequent nature's responsiveness to the world is the locus at which the momentariness of the world is taken up into God; whether this compromises the non-momentary status of the divine actuality as a whole is precisely the question that the qualified-momentarist reading resolves: it does not, because the divine actuality is the *bearer* of both poles, and the conditioned pole's participation in worldly momentariness is bounded by the unconditioned pole's stability.

Within the single actual entity that is God, the two poles stand in just the relation that holds between the *ālayavijñāna*'s two aspects: a non-momentary unconditioned pole and a conditioned pole that participates in the momentary character of the world it engages.

This is, I want to emphasize again, the structure that supports the antitheses. "God is permanent and the World fluent" tracks the primordial-nature-of-God vs world-actual-occasions contrast. "The World is permanent and God is fluent" tracks the world-considered-as-objectively-immortal-in-the-consequent-nature vs God-as-changing-through-the-consequent-nature contrast. The antitheses' apparent paradoxicality dissolves once the dual-pole structure of God is read as instantiating qualified momentariness on *both* sides—within God (primordial vs consequent) and across God-and-world (God-as-non-perishing-actuality vs world-as-perishing-actual-occasions). The "shift of meaning" Whitehead names without analyzing is, on this reading, the shift between the conditioned and unconditioned aspects of the same dipolar reality.

5.4 The Epochal Objection

The technical objection to this reading is one I anticipated at the end of section 4. Whitehead's actual occasion, on his own analysis, is *epochal*: it does not occur *in* an infinitely divisible time but constitutes a *quantum* of becoming with its own internal duration. The *kṣaṇa* of Buddhist momentariness, on at least the strongest readings, is *instantaneous*: a durationless point in time. If these are different, then the comparison fails at the technical level; what looks like the same momentariness on both sides is in fact two different metaphysical commitments masquerading as one.

The objection has been raised, in roughly this form, against earlier attempts to read Whitehead's process metaphysics through Buddhist *kṣaṇa* metaphysics.³² It must be answered, not waved away. My answer has three parts. First, the description of *kṣaṇa* as straightforwardly "instantaneous" is itself contested within the Buddhist scholastic tradition. Kang Hyōngch'öl's careful analysis of the Sautrāntika–Vasubandhu doctrine of momentariness

³² The most influential version of this objection, in the Korean comparative literature, can be inferred from Kwōn's repeated emphasis on the differences between actual occasion and *kṣaṇa* even where the similarities are acknowledged. See, e.g., Kwōn, "Tarūmak'irit'i wa Hwait'ūhedū sasang ūi chōpchōm."

against the Sarvāstivāda treatment shows that the question of whether *kṣaṇa* has duration is one of the central disputes within Buddhist scholasticism, and Vasubandhu himself never gave a clear answer.³³ Hirakawa's reading takes the Sautrāntika *kṣaṇa* to be durationless and the Sarvāstivāda *kṣaṇa* to have a duration; even within this reading, *some* canonical Buddhist positions ascribe duration to the *kṣaṇa*. The objection's premise—that *kṣaṇa* is univocally instantaneous in Buddhism—is therefore false. The technical category *kṣaṇa* admits of internal scholastic variation precisely on the durational question, and the variation runs all the way to positions that are very close to Whitehead's epochal account.

Second, even granting that the strictest Buddhist *kṣaṇa* (the Sautrāntika one) is durationless, the philosophical work the *kṣaṇa* concept does for momentariness is not the durationlessness as such but the *radical non-persistence* of the momentary entity—the fact that the entity arises and perishes within a single quantum of becoming and does not persist beyond that quantum to a subsequent one. The same philosophical work is done by Whitehead's epochal occasion: it arises and perishes within a single quantum of becoming and does not persist beyond that quantum.³⁴ What makes the entity momentary is not the temporal *thinness* of its existence but the radical *unity* of its arising-and-perishing as a single act. On this analysis, the durational/durationless contrast within Buddhist scholasticism is internal to the *kṣaṇa* concept rather than a contrast between *kṣaṇa* and something else; Whitehead's epochal occasion is, on the same internal logic, one more variant within the *kṣaṇa*-family of momentary entities.

Third, and decisively for the formal argument of this paper, the homology I have argued for is *between the relation non-identity-non-difference and the relation underlying the antitheses*, not between *kṣaṇa* and actual occasion *simpliciter*. What the homology requires is that *the conditioned pole* in both metaphysical structures be radically momentary in the philosophically relevant sense (non-persistence beyond the quantum of becoming) and that *the unconditioned pole* in both

³³ See Kang Hyōngch'öl. This paper documents the Sarvāstivāda / Sautrāntika dispute on whether *kṣaṇa* has duration and shows that Vasubandhu himself does not settle the question.

³⁴ The "epochal theory of time" is one of Whitehead's most distinctive contributions to the metaphysics of becoming. For the canonical development, see *PR* Part I, ch. 2 (temporal atomicity); Part IV (extension); and *Science and the Modern World*, chs. 7–8 (the earlier development). For analysis, see Ford, *Emergence of Whitehead's Metaphysics*, ch. 3.

metaphysical structures be non-momentary in the philosophically relevant sense (not subject to arising-and-perishing). Both conditions are satisfied. The epochal-vs-instantaneous question, even if it could be settled in a way the objector demands, would touch only the precise *internal structure* of the conditioned pole on the Whiteheadian side; it would not touch the structural relation between the two poles, which is what the homology is about.

5.5 What the Metaphysical Grounding Accomplishes

The dialectic of the article can now be seen at a single glance. Whitehead's antitheses *formally require* a relation that is neither identity nor difference between God's two natures (section 4.1). Wŏnhyo's *Commentary on the Awakening of Faith* explicitly specifies such a relation, non-identity-non-difference, with its associated apparatus of dependence-without-collapse and opening-and-joining (section 3 and section 4.2). The formal homology between the relation Whitehead's text presupposes and the relation Wŏnhyo's text specifies is exact in its four key features (section 4.2). The transposition of the apparatus from one text to the other is legitimate because formal homology is indeed *formal*—it does not require sameness of *relata*, only sameness of *relation* (section 4.3). And—the new contribution of this section—both formal structures are grounded in the same *metaphysical* commitment: qualified momentariness, the thesis that the conditioned pole of reality is radically momentary while the unconditioned pole is not (section 5.1–section 5.3). The metaphysical grounding closes the loop. Whitehead's antitheses are coherent because the dipolar structure of his God instantiates qualified momentariness; Wŏnhyo's non-identity-non-difference is coherent because the dipolar structure of his *ālayavijñāna* instantiates the same qualified momentariness; the formal apparatus that works on one side works on the other because the same metaphysics is at work in both.

There is a further consequence that should be made explicit. The reading I have argued for is *more conservative* with respect to Whitehead's own text than the major alternatives canvassed in section 2. Hartshorne's society-of-occasions revision required *changing* what Whitehead said about God (one actual entity, not many). Griffin's softening of dipolarity into asymmetric complexity required *loosening* what Whitehead said about the antitheses (a complex relation, not the strict symmetric one PR 348 presents). Sherburne's elimination required *deleting* God from the system. The Wŏnhyean reading developed here requires *none* of these revisions. God remains a single actual

entity. The antitheses remain strictly symmetric. The two natures remain co-predicable of one God. What changes is only the *analysis* of how this is possible—and the analysis comes from a tradition Whitehead did not know but whose formal apparatus is precisely calibrated to the problem his text leaves open.

This is, I want to suggest, the most modest comparative claim that does the philosophical work. The claim is not that Wŏnhyo and Whitehead are saying the same thing. The claim is not that Buddhist metaphysics is a hidden secret of process theology. The claim is that a *formal problem* internal to one tradition admits of a *formal solution* developed within another, that the solution requires no importation of substantive metaphysical content, and that the solution leaves the text it analyzes more intact than any of the existing alternatives. The next and final section draws out what follows.

6. Conclusion

6.1 The Argument in One Line

This article has argued that Whitehead's antitheses at *Process and Reality* 348 instantiate the formal relation Wŏnhyo specifies as non-identity-non-difference, that the structural homology survives the most serious objections one can raise against it, and that both formal structures are grounded in the same metaphysics of qualified momentariness. The unity-problem that Ford, Hartshorne, Griffin, and Sherburne have each evaded in a different direction is, on this reading, a tractable problem whose solution has been hiding in plain sight for fourteen centuries in a tradition the process community has not seriously consulted. The cost of consulting it is small: a willingness to take seriously the proposition that a seventh-century Korean Buddhist commentator may have analyzed, with rigor and explicitness, a relational structure that a twentieth-century English mathematician used without analyzing.

6.2 Implications for Process Theology

For the process tradition specifically, three consequences follow. First, Hartshorne's society-of-occasions revision can be seen, on the reading argued for here, as a *solution in search of a problem*. The problem Hartshorne diagnoses—that Whitehead's God cannot be both an actual entity in the strict sense and a

dipolar reality whose two natures stand in genuine tension—turns out to be a problem only on the assumption that the relation between the two natures must be either identity or difference. The non-identity-non-difference apparatus shows that the assumption is false. With a third option formally specified, Hartshorne's substitution is no longer forced; it becomes one possible response to a problem that has another.³⁵

Second, Griffin's distinction between "Whiteheadian dipolarity" and "Hartshornean dipolarity" should be re-described. On Griffin's framing, the two are alternative dipolar conceptions one might endorse for substantive theological reasons. On the framing developed here, they are not equally well-positioned with respect to Whitehead's text. Whiteheadian dipolarity—strict, symmetric, predicating both poles of one actual entity—is what *Process and Reality* says. Hartshornean dipolarity is a deliberate departure from that text whose motivation has been the assumption that strict-symmetric dipolarity is incoherent. If the present argument is sound, that motivation has been undermined. The text can be defended as written.

Third, Sherburne's elimination of God from Whitehead's system was always a last resort, and Sherburne himself presented it that way. The eliminativist position has continued to draw adherents within the process community largely because the alternatives have not been formally adequate.³⁶ An adequate alternative—one that lets the antitheses be what they say they are, lets God be the one actual entity Whitehead said God is, and analyzes the unity of the two natures in a formally specifiable way—removes the philosophical pressure that has sustained the eliminativist option. Whether the option will continue to find defenders for other reasons is not a question this paper can settle; what it can settle is that the *unity-problem* is no longer one of those reasons.

6.3 The Wider Methodological Point

Beyond the process-theological argument, the article has a methodological

³⁵ This is not, I should be clear, an argument against Hartshorne's broader process theology. Hartshorne's contributions to dipolar theism, neoclassical ontology, and the modal version of the ontological argument stand on their own substantive merits. What the present argument touches is specifically the textual reading of Whitehead in light of the unity-problem, where Hartshorne's revision was offered as a solution that the present analysis suggests is not forced.

³⁶ Sherburne's own later "Decentering Whitehead" confirms that the eliminativist option has continued to find sympathetic readers within the process community even decades after the original 1967 article.

proposal that I want to make explicit in closing. Comparative philosophy of religion has, over the last three decades, faced a recurring criticism from skeptics of cross-tradition comparison: the worry that comparisons import substantive metaphysical content under the cover of formal parallels, and that the result is not philosophical advance but an unstable hybrid that neither tradition can endorse.³⁷ The worry has force. Much comparative work has, in fact, proceeded by gesturing at thematic resemblances and then drawing conclusions that the gesturing alone cannot support. The result is sometimes illuminating and sometimes confusing, and the difficulty of distinguishing the two in advance has been a serious obstacle to comparative work being taken seriously by single-tradition specialists.

The methodological proposal of this article is more modest than what the comparative tradition has often attempted, and more demanding. It is *more modest* because it does not claim that the two traditions agree on metaphysics, that one anticipates the other, or that both express a common philosophical vision. It is *more demanding* because it requires that the formal relation imported from one tradition into the other be specified rigorously enough that its applicability to a problem in the host tradition can be assessed point for point. The four-feature match I argued for in section 4.2 was an attempt to meet that demand. Whether the match holds is, of course, open to dispute; the methodological commitment is to make the match precise enough that the dispute can be conducted on the merits.

If formal homologies of this kind can be specified and assessed rigorously, comparative philosophy of religion has a distinctive contribution to make to ongoing problems within single traditions. The contribution is not the supply of *content*—the metaphysics of one tradition does not become available to another by comparison—but the supply of *analytical apparatus*. Where one tradition has worked out the formal logic of a relation that another tradition uses without analyzing, the worked-out logic can do analytical work for the problem the second tradition has been unable to close on its own. This is, I think, what the comparative philosophy of religion is best positioned to offer. It is also what the present paper has tried to do.

³⁷ The classical statement of this concern is Raimon Panikkar. More recent versions of the concern, focused on the methodology of cross-tradition formal comparison, can be found in the comparative philosophy literature of the past two decades.

6.4 What Remains

The argument leaves four substantive questions open, which I should name rather than conceal. First, the formal homology has been argued for, in this article, at the level of the relation between God's two natures. Whitehead's antitheses, however, work both *within* God (primordial vs. consequent) *and* across God-and-world (God-as-permanent vs. world-as-fluent and the reverse). The four-feature match developed in section 4.2 was framed in terms of the intra-divine relation. Whether the same apparatus extends to the God-world relation in a formally watertight way, or whether a more elaborate two-level analysis is required, is a question I have not been able to fully address here.³⁸

Second, the consequent nature's responsiveness to the momentary actual occasions of the world raises questions about *how* the unconditioned divine actuality can absorb conditioned momentariness without itself becoming momentary. The qualified-momentarist response (the bearer of the two poles is non-momentary; the conditioned pole's participation in worldly momentariness is bounded by the unconditioned pole's stability) is, in the present article, asserted more than argued. A fuller treatment would need to address Sherburne's specific objections about the prehension of contemporaries, which I touched on in section 2.4 but did not fully meet.³⁹

Third, the soteriological dimension of Wŏnhyo's analysis—the question of how the One Mind's two aspects are related to the practitioner's path of awakening—has been deliberately set aside in this article. The reason is methodological: I argued in section 4.3 that the formal apparatus is separable from the soteriological frame. Whether *Whitehead's* dipolar God admits of a comparable soteriological reading, or whether the question of awakening is one

³⁸ The difficulty registered here is one of distinguishing the *intra-divine* dipolar structure (primordial / consequent) from the *cosmological* dipolar structure (God / world). The two structures are related but not identical; the antitheses of PR 348 work primarily in the cosmological register, while the formal apparatus of *Process and Reality* Part V works primarily in the intra-divine register. A formally complete defense of the homology would need to map both registers onto Wŏnhyo's apparatus, which has its own intra-mental and cosmological registers (the One Mind itself and its relations to the phenomenal world).

³⁹ Sherburne's objection that God's prehension of contemporaries violates PR 95 and PR 102 (see section 2.4 above) remains a serious technical problem that the present article has not directly resolved. A complete defense of strict Whiteheadian dipolarity would need to address whether the qualified-momentarist reading developed here supplies new resources for handling the contemporary-independence question—for example, by distinguishing the temporal mode in which the consequent nature receives worldly actualities from the temporal mode in which actual occasionsprehend each other. I leave this for further work.

of the substantive Buddhist commitments that genuinely does not transfer, remains an open question for further work.

Fourth, the present article has worked with Wŏnhyo's commentarial apparatus as it stands. A more historically careful study would situate Wŏnhyo's reading within the wider Tang-era debate over the *Awakening of Faith's* interpretation, weighing Fazang's competing analysis and the influence of both readings on subsequent East Asian Buddhist thought. The narrowness of the present treatment is a price I have paid for analytical concentration; the price would have to be paid back, in a more developed version of the argument, by historical work I have not done here.⁴⁰

6.5 A Closing Word

Whitehead is reported to have said, at the end of the Gifford Lectures, that he had been making "the final draft of my Giffords" through the autumn of 1928—"having to keep the whole scheme of thoughts in my head, so as to get all the points written up in order."⁴¹ He acknowledged, with characteristic understatement, that he was "not well suited to this job of final revision."⁴² The text he left us is a palimpsest, written through and over itself, whose later insertions speak to formal demands the earlier strata were not designed to meet. The dipolar conception of God is the most consequential of these insertions. It is also the one whose formal architecture Whitehead's text most visibly does not supply.

What I have tried to argue in this article is that the architecture, while absent from Whitehead's own pages, is not absent from the philosophical record. A seventh-century Korean commentator, reading a fifth- or sixth-century Chinese Buddhist treatise on a problem about consciousness, articulated the formal apparatus that Whitehead's text formally requires. The two thinkers are not the same. The two problems are not the same. The two metaphysics are

⁴⁰ See Fazang. On how Fazang's handling of the *Awakening of Faith* passage diverges from Wŏnhyo's, see the comparative work cited in section 3 above.

⁴¹ Whitehead, letter to his son North Whitehead, December 23, 1928; reproduced in Ford, "Some Proposals."

⁴² Ford, "Some Proposals," paraphrasing Whitehead's own report. The full passage about Whitehead being "not well suited to this job of final revision" is Ford's characterization of the situation rather than Whitehead's direct words; I have, accordingly, set the phrase in quotation marks but attribute it as Ford's gloss in this footnote.

not the same. What is the same—what the present article has tried to show is the same—is the structural relation between two poles of a single ultimate reality, both standing in opposition and both belonging to one bearer, that neither identity nor difference can correctly characterize. Wŏnhyo named this relation non-identity-non-difference and analyzed it. Whitehead used it and did not. The completion of process theology's most enduring open problem may have been available, all along, in a commentary developed for an entirely different problem.

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