The following article is a companion piece to Dr. Stein’s recent piece in Process Studies 53.2 entitled “A Metaphysical Analysis of Chemical Change: Toward a Reconciliation of Whiteheadian Process Metaphysics and Aristotelian-Scholastic Substance Metaphysics.” The present article seeks to make Dr. Stein’s research accessible and relevant to a more general audience beyond specialized scholars, as is the mission of the blog more generally. Enjoy!
Jared Morningstar
Editor-in-Chief
“Life is change,
How it differs from the rocks.”
Paul Katner, 1968
Crown of Creation
If there is any constant in the universe, it’s the ubiquity of change. Continents shift, mountains crumble, humans grow old, and molecules collide to bring forth the unexpected. Change occurs on all scales of time and size.
Of course, not everyone believes that things change. Among the ancients, while Heraclitus was telling us that the world is in constant flux, Parmenides was explaining that change is mere illusion; the world is an eternal unity, and thus incapable of change. Philosophy moves on, and a couple centuries later Aristotle comes along and says they are both right… and both wrong. Aristotle seeks a middle ground. Change is real, he asserts, but occurs within a framework of enduring substance. Fast forward a couple thousand more years and we find Alfred North Whitehead writing that not only is change real, change is the only reality and, indeed, constitutes reality. To paraphrase Whitehead, reality is process (Whitehead [1925] 1967, p. 25).
Poor old Parmenides doesn’t have many followers these days, philosophers generally agreeing that change is real. The question now is one of metaphysics, not whether change is real, but rather, what must the world be like for change to occur.
And that’s what this essay is about, trying to discover the metaphysical underpinnings of physical change. But, before we launch into this, I need to sidetrack a bit and tell you something about myself and give you some context for my particular approach to this problem.
I am a chemist, and that particular species of chemist that studies the chemical transformation of molecules. Throughout my adult life, I have been fascinated with how one sort of molecule undergoes transformation into another sort of molecule. I study how fast these reactions occur and how the environment in which the molecule finds itself affects the speed of these reactions. And then from these studies, I’m able to draw inferences about how the molecule underwent the chemical reaction. The how of chemical reactions defines what chemists call the ‘mechanism’ of the reaction.
While I’m not a professional philosopher, I’ve always been of a philosophical bent. About twenty-five years in a used-book store, I came across a copy of David Griffin’s The Reenchantment of Science (Griffin 1988), and I was hooked. I had discovered process philosophy, with its emphasis on the centrality of change and flux in nature. I immediately saw how the metaphysical teachings of Whitehead and other process thinkers might help me understand, at a deep level, the mechanisms of chemical reactions. It seemed that process philosophy would allow me to move from the how of chemical reactions, to the why, that is, the metaphysical principles that ground the chemical transformation of molecules.
More recently, I discovered Aristotelian-Scholastic metaphysics, primarily through the work of Edward Feser, W. Norris Clarke, and David Oderberg. Similar to process thought, this metaphysical system places an emphasis on change, asserting that change exists as a potentiality in all physical entities that exist in the world.
So, in this essay I want to probe the metaphysical underpinnings of physical change, but in the specific context of the chemical change of molecules, to examine the why of chemical reactions. I’ll be asking what grounds such change in the world, where one sort of molecule is able to chemically transform into another sort of molecule. Here, I analyze the chemical transformation of molecules (CTM) from two metaphysical perspectives: substance metaphysics of the sort advanced by Aristotle and later by medieval Scholastic philosophers, such as Thomas Aquinas, and process metaphysics, especially that of Alfred North Whitehead. At the end of the day, we will see commonalities between these two systems, and ask if they can be reconciled despite the rift that seems to exist between process and substance philosophy [1].
I begin by discussing what chemistry has to say about CTM. We will see that any given molecule can typically undergo a range of different types of chemical transformation, where each of these transformations has specific energy requirements. Moreover, relations, both internal and external to the molecule, play a critical role in determining the sorts of transformation a molecule can undergo. These two factors, energy and relation, are key to CTM.
I next develop a metaphysical account of CTM, an undertaking that requires the resources of a metaphysical system that regards relation and energy as central to any explanation of change. Two such systems are the substance philosophy in the classical tradition of Aristotelian-Scholastic thought and process philosophy, especially as developed by Alfred North Whitehead.
Whitehead’s process philosophy affirms an ontology of relational becoming, where the actualities [2] of the world are best conceived as processes with temporal evolutions that are intertwined and dependent on the becoming of all other actualities. Central to Whitehead’s philosophy is the concept of ‘energy’, where an actuality, as process, is a “locus of energy”, and its becoming, a flow of energy (Whitehead [1933] 1967, p. 185).
In contrast, Aristotle’s philosophy of nature teaches that actualities are substances. However, these are not the static substances of Descartes and Lock. Rather, the substances of Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition are dynamic and relational (Clarke 1993, p. 164).
As in Whiteheadian process thought, energy plays a critical role in some contemporary interpretations of Aristotle. Specifically, matter, a central feature of Aristotle’s doctrine of hylomorphism, which describes substance as a fusion of matter and form, has been equated with energy (Clarke 2001, pp. 147-148; Oderberg 2007, p. 76; Oderberg 2022).
Finally, I describe CTM from these two perspectives of Aristotelian substance metaphysics and Whiteheadian process metaphysics. In both cases, chemical change is seen to depend on how each metaphysical system understands what a molecule is. In the former system, CTM is a quintessential example of what Aristotle, in a technical mood, would call a ‘hylomorphic substantial change’, where the matter of the molecule takes on a new form, while in the latter system, CTM reflects the creative advance of the molecule as dynamic process to a new patten of stability.
I conclude by reflecting on what’s been discussed in this essay, and our newly found discoveries of what Aristotle and Whitehead can teach us about the why of molecular change. What I hope will be clear is that Aristotle’s and Whitehead’s teachings share much overlap with one another, both basing CTM in the relentlessly dynamic nature of reality. Such similarity raises the question of reconciliation: can these two metaphysical systems be reconciled? While such a reconciliation may seem possible, the question that philosophers and scientists alike must ask is which of these ontologies better reflects nature. In the end, it seems that we need to develop a new way to speak of the actualities of world, not as substances or processes, but a way that subsumes both.
Chemical Transformation of Molecules
Every chemist learns at their mother’s knee that all molecules are subject to chemical change and that that every molecule can undergo a variety of chemical transformations [3]. Take the molecule inosine, for example.
Inosine is a member of a biologically important class of molecules called ‘nucleosides’, and can undergo a diverse array of chemical transformations, some of which are shown in the figure below (Suzuki 1974, Suzuki and Yatabe 1974).
Figure 1. Some chemical transformations of the molecule inosine (Suzuki 1974, Suzuki and Yatabe 1974).
Now, the sorts of chemical transformations a molecule can undergo are dictated by four factors: (i) its atomic composition, (ii) how these atoms are connected to one another, (iii) 3-dimensional shape, and (iv) the environment in which the molecule finds itself. Given this, we can identify three conditions that must be met if CMT is to occur:
- The molecule must acquire sufficient energy. Chemical transformations occur when the bonds between atoms are strained and ruptured, and new bonds between atoms are formed. These processes all require the input of energy. One way molecular systems acquire this energy is relational, through collision with solvent molecules, not unlike the energy acquired by a billiard ball when it is struck by the cue ball.
- The energy must distribute to and excite specific chemical bonds. For a chemical reaction to occur, not only must sufficient energy be available to and absorbed by the molecule, but this energy must also be absorbed by the molecule in such a way that it activates specific chemical bonds. This energy is called the ‘energy of activation’ or ‘activation energy’.
- The molecular system must be in the correct orientation. Although molecules are defined by both the connectivity that exists among its constituent atoms and the 3-dimensional shape that this connectivity imparts, molecules are dynamic entities. Molecular structure has a high degree of flexibility, defined not only by rotation about bonds between atoms but also by subtle bends and torsions in the overall shape. Even when the above two conditions have been met, the molecule must be in a particular conformation if the chemical reactions is to occur.
We see that the chemical transformation of a molecule is dependent on relation, both internal and external, which in turn is dependent on the dynamics of the molecular system in its solution environment. When the conditions of energy acquisition and distribution are met and the molecular system is configured in just the right way, chemical transformation occurs
Process Philosophy and Energy
Process philosophy offers us a view of the world in which becoming is more fundamental than being. The actualities of this world are dynamic entities with temporal evolutions that depend on relational interaction with other actualities.
Process ontology opposes the substance ontology of the early modern era of philosophy, which viewed substances as static, elemental particles with no interior natures, and the change of complex entities as the mechanical rearrangement of these elemental particles. The lessons that contemporary science has taught us are at odds with static, mechanical pictures of nature. Both the biological and molecular sciences describe a world of relational dynamism, in which properties of molecules and organisms are never static and must always be viewed in the context of environment. The tenets of process philosophy have been shown to provide strong metaphysical support to the findings of chemistry, biochemistry, and biology (Stein 2004, Stein 2006, Dupré and Nicholson 2018, Guttinger 2018, Dupré 2020, Guttinger 2021, Allassia 2022, Stein 2022).
However, process philosophy is not alone in recognizing the profound dynamism of the natural world. As I describe in more detail below, the classical ontology of Aristotelian-Scholastic thought views substances as having inner natures, essences, that respond dynamically to environmental influences (Clarke 1993, Clarke 2001, Feser 2019). And recent work in Neo-Aristotelian ontology has produced explicitly dynamic accounts of what it is to be a living organism (Austin 2019, Austin and Marmodoro 2019).
So, given that both process ontology and Aristotelian substance ontology assert the importance of dynamism and change in the natural world, what differentiates the two ontologies? Process philosophy goes beyond the mere assertion that processes are important, and makes the bold claim that process is the fundamental ontological category. Thus, the mantra of process philosophy: “to be actual is to be a process” (Cobb and Griffin 1976, p. 14).
But what can it possibly mean to say that an actuality is a process? To answer this question, we turn to the work of Alfred North Whitehead, and the foundational role that energy plays in the unfolding of physical reality. Whitehead was greatly influenced by Einstein’s work in formulating the equivalence of mass and energy. Einstein told us that the universe is made of a single stuff and this stuff is energy; “matter is where the concentration of energy is greatest” (Einstein and Infeld 1938, p. 242). Whitehead explained in his magnum opus Process and Reality that “the distinction between matter and radiant energy has now vanished” (Whitehead [1929] 1978, p. 109), and in a later work that “matter has been identified with energy” (Whitehead [1938] 1968, p. 137).
However, Whitehead recognized that the concept of ‘energy’, as used in science, is a limiting and perhaps even misleading abstraction (Whitehead [1933] 1967, p. 186). In the ontology that he developed, he posits that pulsing through every actuality (or ‘actual occasion’), is a complex energy that is purposive and creative. Whitehead tells us that the ‘energy’ of the physicist is but one manifestation of this complex energy (Whitehead [1933] 1967, p. 185)
The Whiteheadian philosopher asks that we conceive “all things as energy, active and creative” (Wallack 1980, p. 53). Process thinker Marjorie Hewitt Suchocki amplifies Whitehead’s thoughts and tells us that in the becoming of an entity, “each element of existence draws from the transmitted energies of its past, combining these energies in a creative moment toward its own actuality” (Suchocki 1997, p. 12). To become is be a nexus of energy flow.
We see then that process philosophy’s startling assertion that actualities are processes, follows directly from the fundamental role Whitehead proposed for energy in defining what an actuality is and how it evolves through time, its becoming.
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Aristotelian-Scholastic Concept of Dynamic, Relational Substance
The development of process philosophy was motivated by perceived metaphysical inadequacies of the ontologies of early modern philosophers, such as Descartes and Locke, that conceive substances as static, elemental particles that are mechanically arranged to constitute the actualities of the world. This remains the predominant view in Western philosophy and the view against which process thought rebels.
However, this in no way represents the classical view of substance [4]. First we should note that Aristotle’s ousia is best translated not as substance, but as a physical “entity” (Sfekas 1991, p. 40), and not only include horses and men, as exemplified in Aristotle’s Categories, but also, as pointed out by W. Norris Clarke, single celled organisms and non-living entities, such as molecules and atoms (Clarke 2001, p. 65).
Aristotle’s ousia are not the static substances of modern philosophy, but are dynamic and relational. Leonard Eslick argues that “it is a travesty to depict Aristotle’s substance as static and inert, hermetically sealed off from the causal efficacy of other entities, and devoid of any internal becoming” (Eslick 1958, p. 504). Stanley Sfekas echoes these thoughts, maintaining that “the notion of substance as a characterless substrate is an absurd one, and Aristotle never held such a notion” (Sfekas 1991, p. 38). In a similar manner, W. Norris Clarke explains that the classical, pre-Cartesian notion of substance is one of dynamism and relation, where substance is “an abiding center of acting and being acted upon [with] relations as an intrinsic dimension of being” (Clarke 1993, p. 164). The dynamic nature that characterizes substances has its basis in Aristotle’s complex, and perhaps enigmatic, doctrine of hylomorphism (from the Greek hyle matter, and morphé form), which teaches that every physical entity, or actuality, is a composite of form and matter. But what exactly are Aristotle’s “form” and “matter”? Unfortunately, simple definitions are impossible to come by, as Aristotelian philosophers Anna Marmodoro and Michele Paoletti indicate:
Providing a brief and uncontroversial introduction to the metaphysical theory known as hylomorphism is a nearly impossible task… Roughly speaking, hylomorphism is the metaphysical position according to which objects have a ‘formal’ as well as a ‘material’ component. The philosophical meaning of each of these terms is controversial. (Marmodoro and Paoletti 2021, p. 52647)
Perhaps overly enamored of contemporary science, many modern day Aristotelian philosophers (i.e., Neo-Aristotelians) think of form and matter as structure and content, things that can be discovered and analyzed using the methods of science (Koslicki 2008). However, this is not the classical view of the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition, where form and matter are metaphysical principles [5], and thus cannot be revealed by science.
Aristotelians maintain that form and matter are related to one another in the same way that actuality and potentially are related to one another, where a physical entity that exists in the world can be said to possess not only actuality (i.e., it is what it is now), but also potentiality (i.e., it may become something else later). Aristotle tells us that the actuality of an entity is its form, while potentiality resides in its matter, which has the potentiality to take on a new form. Edward Feser explains that matter is that which needs actualizing, and form is that which results from actualization of matter (Feser 2019, p. 21).
Perhaps I can make this clearer by once again considering inosine, more specifically, by considering a solution of inosine in water. Each molecule of inosine in this solution is an ousia, a physical entity, that derives its actuality from it having a specific form, i.e., the form of an inosine molecule. Each molecule also possesses potentiality; the potentiality to enter into a variety of chemical reactions and take on a new form. The basis for this potentiality is its matter, which possesses the potentiality to take on a new form. We see then that according to Aristotle’s hylomorphism, inosine is a composite of its actuality as the form of inosine, and its matter which can take on a new form.
Aristotle developed the doctrine of hylomorphism to account for the ability of substances to change. Aristotle speaks of two kinds of change that a substance can undergo—accidental and substantial. In accidental change, a substance takes on or loses a property, but persists through the change as that substance (e.g., a man loses his hair and becomes bald, or Socrates becomes pale). In contrast, in substantial change, a form is lost and a new one appears, as we saw above for the chemical reactions of inosine. During substantial change, what loses one form and then takes on a new form during is matter, or more correctly ‘prime matter’ [6]. The argument here is that there must be something that undergoes substantial change. “Without prime matter, there could be no substantial change, because there would be no subject of change that persists through the change.” (Feser 2019, p. 30)
But how does change occur? In Aristotelian-Scholastic metaphysics, change can only occur if one substance is influenced by another substance, the agent of change or the efficient cause of the change. The efficient cause is that which brings about change by actualizing a potential, and it does so by exercising its own powers. The efficient cause of a change always actualizes a potentiality in the substance that is to undergo change.
Finally, causation has a directionality towards some specific outcome. The directionality of causation is Aristotle’s final cause. A thing’s inherent causal powers are grounded in its form; that is, an actuality has a certain potential towards an outcome because of what it is, its form.
Prime Matter Reconsidered: Is Prime Matter Energy?
At this juncture, we need to reconsider prime matter. Aristotelian philosopher David Oderberg explains that positing the existence of prime matter is the only way to account for change—there must be something with which the new form unites. And further, there has to be something that remains the same throughout substantial change. That something is prime matter (Oderberg 2007, p. 72). Oderberg explains that prime matter is “pure potentially, without any form whatsoever, but wholly receptive of form… it is the support of all substantial change” (Oderberg 2007, p. 72).
Oderberg admits that this looks like “spooky metaphysics” (Oderberg 2007, p. 72). We are left wondering what precisely prime matter is. This is a question which has likely been asked since antiquity, often with the answer: “Aristotle’s notion of matter is unintelligible” (Pfeiffer 2021).
However, recent scholarship offers a tentative answer to this question—prime matter is energy. Clarke wrote in 2001 that prime matter is the “energy, that physicists speak of when they describe the whole material cosmos as a constant process of ‘transformation of energy’” (Clarke 2001, p. 101). Later in the same volume he goes on to write that energy fulfills “all the requirements of the Thomistic primary matter as the ultimate principle continuity underlying all forms” (Clarke 2001, p. 147).
Oderberg came to the same realization, suggesting in his 2007 book Real Essentialism that prime matter might be energy (Oderberg 2007, p. 76). At that time, he did not develop the idea further, but he returned to it in a 2022 paper title “Is Prime Matter Energy?” (Oderberg 2022). All things considered, Oderberg concludes, the worst case is the simple plausibility of prime matter equaling energy. But just suppose, he says, that prime matter is energy. That is what we consider next.
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Energy and Change: Two Ontological Accounts
Energy can be seen to be center stage in both Aristotelian substance ontology and Whiteheadian process ontology. Might this common ground be the basis for a reconciliation between these two ontologies? In this section, I’ll illustrate what the beginnings of a reconciliation might look like with an analysis of physical change, specifically the chemical transformation of molecule M1 into molecule M2. We’ll first consider this transformation from the perspective of substance ontology and then process ontology.
An Aristotelian-Scholastic Account of Chemical Change
Any account of the chemical change of a molecule must begin with the question, What is a molecule? The physical sciences tell us that a molecule is a group of atoms that are bonded together and represents the fundamental unit of a chemical compound that can take part in a chemical reaction. This definition raises an important question that still vexes philosophers of chemistry—the question of reduction (Weisberg, Needham et al. 2019). Can the properties of a molecule, including the chemical reactions it can undergo, be explained purely from a consideration of the properties of the atoms that compose it, or do we arrive at more accurate explanations if we view the molecule as a whole, a unity? I think we know how Aristotle would answer this question.
In Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition, a molecule is an example of a substance, an ontological unity whose properties cannot be reduced to those of its constituent atoms. As David Oderberg opines, “The unity of chemical compounds… is a subject of wonder, a phenomenon asking for an explanation” (Oderberg 2019, pp. 212-213).
But how is this unity attained? The solution to this problem according to Thomistic tradition is virtual being. In the case of a molecule, while it cannot be denied that it comprises atoms, those atoms do not exist in the molecule actually, but only virtually. Importantly, the claim is not that the atoms do not exist in the molecule, rather they do not exist in the molecule in the way that they exist when they exist on their own in elemental form (Feser 2019, p. 27). The fact that the molecule has properties that its constituent atoms do not, supports the view that a molecule cannot be reduced to a sum of its parts. By the same token, the molecule lacks properties that the atoms in their elemental form possess.
The unity that a molecule possesses is an empirical property; a property open to experimental verification. This unity manifests as a set of essential properties—what it is to be this sort of molecule rather than another sort of molecule, and what reactions the molecule can or cannot undergo. In the Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition, a molecule would be said to possess a unity and essential properties by virtue of being a substance, a compound of prime matter united to substantial form. The potentiality that is possessed by the prime matter of molecule M1 to receive a new form is the basis for the substantial change that occurs when M1 chemically transforms into M2. The actualization of this potentiality is substantial change.
Significantly, as discussed above, substantial change occurs only in response to the reception of another substance, i.e, the agent of change. In the case of the solution-phase chemical transformation of M1, the agents of change are solvent molecules, which are in constant physical interaction with M1. The actualization of this potentiality for the transformation or substantial change of M1 will have a directedness towards an end, a teleology, to take on a specific new form. In chemistry, this directedness, or ‘molecular teleology’ (Stein 2004, p. 14), is known as the chemical reactivity of the molecule, which refers to the repertoire of chemical transformations the molecule can undergo. That is, the chemical reactivity of a molecule is the sum of its potentiality for substantial change.
Now, Aristotle’s doctrine that potentiality is prime matter can be coupled with Oderberg’s premise that prime matter is energy, allowing us to equate potentiality with energy. As Oderberg points out: “If prime matter equals energy, then all kinds of energy… are cases of potentiality actualized in objects and systems” (Oderberg 2022, p. 13).
Given the understanding that substantial change is the actualization of potentiality driven by an agent of change, it seems that there are two types of energy we need to consider in CTM: Einstein’s mass-equivalent energy that is the substance, and the causal energy of the agent, where causal energy is the motivating force that drives change towards its end [7]. If M1 is to transform into M2, it must acquire a specific amount of energy, the activation energy of a chemical reaction. M1 acquires the energy of activation through collisional interactions with solvent molecules, where each collision is accompanied by a transfer of energy—causal energy—from solvent molecule to M1. According to Oderberg’s hypothesis, this energy is identical to the prime matter that constitutes, along with form, the substance that is the solvent molecule. Once M1 has acquired activation energy for chemical transformation from collision with solvent molecules, M1 can undergo substantial change as its prime matter (i.e., mass-equivalent energy) takes on the new form of M2.
A Whiteheadian Account of Chemical Change
Development of a Whiteheadian account of chemical change begins with the ontological question: What is a molecule? As in the Aristotelian-Scholastic metaphysical tradition, process philosophy sees molecules, like all actualities of the world, as ontological unities. The challenge facing process philosophers is the same as that faced by the Schoolmen—how to account for the unity of complex actualities. Process philosophers have found several strategies to explain this unity. Ivor Leclerc explains that this unity arises from the reciprocal “acting” of the constituents of a compound object, explaining that “The entities in relation act on each other reciprocally, and are thus each modified, in some respect, by the relationship, that is, by their acting. This reciprocal acting constitutes a tie or bond between them, this bond being the relation which exists only in the acting” (Leclerc 1972, pp. 309-312).
Process philosophers of biology John Dupré and Daniel Nicholson, in their “Manifesto for a Processual Philosophy of Biology”, explain that biological entities can be envisioned as processes within process:
Both organisms and their parts are exquisitely regulated conglomerates of nested streams of matter and energy. The processes that make up the biological hierarchy not only compose one another but also provide many of the enabling conditions for the persistence of other processes in the hierarchy, at both higher and lower levels. (Dupré and Nicholson 2018, p. 27)
Nicholas Rescher expresses similar sentiments: “processual particulars are systemic wholes comprised of subordinate processes in ways that factor ‘all the way down’” (Rescher 1996, p. 55).
The idea that a molecule is a process, and not a thing, is at odds with traditional chemical thinking, which is deeply rooted in a post-Cartesian ontology of substance. Think of the ball-and-stick depictions of molecules from your high school chemistry class. According to this tradition molecules are defined by the arrangement of their constituent atoms in 3-dimensional space. The attribute of possessing, and being ultimately defined by, a fixed arrangement of parts allows us to view molecules as deterministic machines. But at the same it is axiomatic in chemistry that the properties of a molecule are rooted in its structure. This of course presents a considerable problem: If molecules are rigid machines how do properties of the molecule, which are so entirely different from those of its constituent atoms, emerge from atomic arrangement?
Process thought tells us that to answer this question, notions of static material and substance must be rejected and be replaced with a philosophy of dynamism and relatedness. John Cobb explains:
the properties of an atom are always the properties of that atom as its existence is determined by its relations to its environment. Atoms acquire different properties when they are arranged in different molecular structures because these different structures constitute different environments. Instead of viewing molecules as machines, we should view them as ecosystems. Science may continue to ask what properties a certain type of atom continues to have in great varieties of contexts, but it should add the question as to the diverse properties the atom acquires in different relationships. This ecological approach to the study of atoms can subsume the materialistic one, whereas the materialistic approach cannot subsume the ecological. (Cobb in Griffin 1988, p. 108; italics mine)
While this concept of “molecules as ecosystems” may initially strike us as strange, it is, in fact, a central part of contemporary chemistry. That the properties of atoms and molecules are determined by context is precisely what quantum chemical theories tell us (Stein 2004, pp. 10-11). Quantum chemical understanding coupled with elements of process thought provide the basis for the development of a contemporary molecular ontology in which molecular entities are not mere objects, “vacuous entities”, but rather can be said to possess a subjective nature that is able to take account of and respond to its environment. Such an ontology can provide John Cobb a physico-chemical basis for his assertion that molecules should be viewed as ecosystems. It is a molecule’s interiority and ability to respond to its environment that can account for seemingly diverse chemical phenomena including molecular change, molecular complexification, and, ultimately, the evolution of life (Stein 2004, Stein 2005, Stein 2006).
Cobb’s metaphor of ‘molecule-as-ecosystem’ also helps us understand the chemical transformation of molecules. We see that similar to a macro-ecosystem, the molecule-as-ecosystem endures through time and maintains identity, not because it is static and unchanging, but rather because it is a dynamic system exhibiting a stability-pattern through time. Seen in this way, molecular change represents an excursion to a new pattern of enduring stability. Chemical transformation of a molecule should not be viewed as a rearrangement of parts, but rather as progression of the molecule-as-ecosystem from one dynamic state to another.
This process-relational view of chemical transformation exemplifies the relational becoming of an actuality, where the becoming involves identity change of the actuality. Here, an enduring object attains the potential for creative advance of a most radical type, in which identity is destroyed and redefined in the course of becoming. Identity dissolves away to be re-created as another. This destruction and redefinition of chemical identity resonates with Whitehead’s concept of ‘perpetual perishing’, where the becoming of an actual entity “draws from the transmitted energies of its past combining these energies in a creative moment toward its own actuality” (Suchocki 1997, p. 12). The becoming of an actuality is always the successive ‘perpetual perishing’ of its antecedent actualities, and antecedent actualities of its environment.
At this juncture, we return to Whitehead and focus our attention on his analysis of actualities as energy, and consider the chemical transformation of molecule M1 into M2. In our earlier review of Whitehead’s thinking, we saw that the becoming of an actuality is defined as a flow of energy. Under such an analysis, M1 will acquire the energy it needs to undergo transformation from relationship; relationship to the solvent molecules with which it collides and internal relationship among the atoms that comprise the molecule. Combined, these two types of relationship define and direct a molecule’s chemical becoming, which is to say a molecule’s chemical reactivity. M1 transforms into M2 when it acquires the activation energy for that particular chemical reaction. Moreover, there is an important three-fold relationship among activation energy, causation, and chemical becoming. In acquiring the activation energy necessary for a chemical transformation, the molecule is, in fact, attaining the causal propensity for the becoming of the molecular system, here defined as M1 and solvent molecules.
Finally, we see that the reality of molecular systems is not to be found merely in the collection of atoms arranged in three-dimensional space. Rather, reality is the continuous becoming of the molecule; molecular reality is process. It is only through becoming that a pattern of stability emerges that is recognizable as a particular molecule. The mode of becoming, whether identity maintenance or transformation, is shaped by environmentally-conditioned relation. Thus, to speak of a chemical reaction is to immediately speak of a molecule in a specific environment. Chemical reactivity, in large part, is a condition imposed by environment. Some environments support a pattern of molecular stability for a time. Other environments favor a mode of becoming in which new patterns are brought forth, giving rise to chemical transformation.
Can Whiteheadian Process Metaphysics Be Reconciled with Aristotelian-Scholastic Substance Metaphysics?
We have seen that to understand the why of the chemical transformation of a molecule requires an ontology of dynamism, an ontology that can be found in Whiteheads process metaphysics and Aristotelian-Scholastic metaphysics. We also saw that the latter is quite distinct from post-Cartesian substance philosophy, with its insistent on the static nature of actualities. The similarities between Whiteheads view of change and that of the Schoolman prompts the question of reconciliation of Whiteheads process metaphysics and Aristotelian-Scholastic metaphysics. This will be the topic of the rest of this essay.
In a recently published book chapter, Christopher Austin and Anna Marmodoro explain that an organism is a “fundamentally unified being—each is in some way one, rather than many”, and then ask “what secures, metaphysically, an organism’s continued persistence as one over time?” (Austin and Marmodoro 2019, p. 169). To answer this question, they developed the premise that this “unity is displayed not in the capacity of an organism to sustain diachronic stasis of its morphological features (and their constituents), but in the persistence of its specified capacity for the dynamically adaptive re-organization of those features” (Austin and Marmodoro 2019, p. 169). Indeed, as outlined early, the entities of Aristotelian-Scholastic tradition are through-and-through dynamic and relational. To my eyes, this all looks a lot like the essentials of a process ontology. Given this, isn’t it fair to say that a reconciliation has already been achieved between Aristotelian-Scholastic substances metaphysics and Whiteheadian process metaphysics?
The dynamic and relational nature of Aristotelian-Scholastic substances notwithstanding, the non-negotiable feature of process metaphysics is that processes are ontologically more fundamental than entities. In all process ontologies, processes give rise to what we interpret as the stable entities of the world. In contrast, in all substance ontologies, entities are metaphysically more significant, and support the various processes that happen to them. The question for philosophers and scientists alike is which of these ontologies better reflects nature.
The goal of science and philosophy is to understand reality, studying the same reality in their unique ways. The question we ask now is how should philosophy speak of this reality—in terms of substance or process? Perhaps neither. It seems to me that we need to develop a new way to speak of the actualities of world, not as substances or processes, but a way that subsumes both.
Notes
- I’m not the first to suggest such a reconciliation. James Felt explored such a possibility some years back (Felt 2001).
- I use ‘actuality’ to refers to a physical entity that stands identifiably apart from its environment, with internal complexity that allows it to interact with its environment and to operate as a whole within its environment. Actualities include living amoebas and cats, as well as atoms and molecules. Piles of bricks, dead cats, and chairs are not actualities.
- For the sake of simplicity, in this paper, I will only be considering organic molecules, i.e., those that are carbon-based such as sucrose and all the metabolites in our bodies. Also, I’ll only be considering reactions that occur in solution, usually water solution, such the reactions that occurs in our bodies.
- W. Norris Clarke explains that “the classical notion of substance as active nature imbedded in a network of relations resulting from its acting and being acted upon has been gradually distorted in successive stages throughout the history of post-Cartesian thought”. Clarke calls this chapter in the history of substance: ‘The Sad Adventures of Substance in Modern Philosophy from Descartes to Whitehead, and identifies the three successive stages of distortion: (1) the Cartesian self-enclosed substance; (2) the Lockean inert substance as unknowable substratum; and (3) the Humean separable substance, rejected as unintelligible (Clarke 1993, p. 164).
- Here, I take Clarke’s use of ‘principle’, as “that from which something flows, either in thought or in being” (Clarke 2001, p. 80). Thus, principle is a root, or ground, or source.
- The distinction between matter and prime matter is not relevant for discussion here. But for the curious, let me explain. I use ‘matter’ as the general term to include the two Aristotelian-Scholastic technical terms ‘prime matter’ and ‘secondary matter’. Feser explains that “if we abstract from our notion of matter all form, leaving nothing but pure potentiality to receive form, we arrive at the idea of primer matter. Matter already having some form or other—that is to say, matter which is actually a stone, or wood, or water, or what have you, is not merely potentially for any of these things—it is secondary matter” (Feser 2019, p. 23).
- In philosophy, there is a strand of thought that connects energy and causation, or efficient causation in Aristotelian terms. David Fair builds a case for physical causal events being constituted by the flow of energy, explaining that energy and momentum “flow from the objects comprising cause to those comprising effect” (Fair 1979). This is echoed by Nancy Frankenberry who tells us that we should interpret the “transmission of energy as creative causal influx” (Frankenberry 1983). Hector Castaneda takes this thinking a step further when he claims the equivalence between cause and energy: “in causation there is a transfer of something in the setup containing the cause to the setup containing the effect… let us dub this causity” (Castaneda 1984, p. 22). Castaneda concludes his analysis with the hypothesis that “it is a safe bet to equate causity with energy” (ibid, p. 23).
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Ross Stein is a biochemist and has devoted his professional career to probing the mechanisms of biochemical reactions, and using this knowledge to help develop new drugs to treat human disease, in particular cancer. In addition, over the past twenty-five years he has become a student of philosophy, and has published in the areas of theology, process philosophy, the philosophy of science. You can learn more about Ross’ background and career at LinkedIn and his publications, in both science and philosophy, at Research Gate.